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STATE STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL 
AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE 
Shannon M. Roesler
*
 
Abstract: The modern administrative state relies on a model of shared governance. 
Federal regulatory regimes addressing a range of economic and social issues depend on the 
participation of state governments for their implementation. Although these state-federal 
partnerships are often cooperative, conflicts over the allocation of regulatory authority and 
administrative policy are inevitable. In recent years, states have sought to resolve some of 
these conflicts in the federal courts. Well-known state challenges to federal authority include 
challenges to environmental rules, health insurance legislation, and immigration policies. In 
these cases, courts have struggled to decide whether states have constitutional standing to 
bring suit against the federal government. 
This Article fills a gap in the legal scholarship by proposing a “governance” approach to 
state standing that would allow states to challenge federal authority when the federal statute 
at issue contemplates an implementation role for state governments. The governance 
approach finds support both in historical precedent and in modern regulatory reality. The 
approach makes state-standing doctrine less susceptible to judicial manipulation and ensures 
that courts focus on other threshold questions often obscured by overly broad, incoherent 
standing analyses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although political debates often inspire rhetoric couched in “states’ 
rights,” the reality is that the separate-spheres or dual-sovereignty 
conception of federalism no longer accurately describes the relationship 
between the states and the federal government. Rather, as the 
administrative state has grown to address the complexities of modern 
life, governments at all levels—federal, state, and local—have 
sometimes collaborated and sometimes competed for regulatory pieces 
of various problems. Governmental jurisdiction over many social issues, 
including environmental and public health issues, is largely concurrent 
and overlapping as states and local governments are charged with the 
authority to implement and enforce federal regulations and policies. An 
ever-growing number of scholars have recognized this shift in the 
jurisdictional landscape and seek to replace old notions of dual 
sovereignty with new accounts that capture the overlapping, contingent 
nature of federal-state authority.
1
 Scholars use adjectives, such as 
                                                     
* Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. I would like to thank Robin Kundis 
Craig for her thoughtful comments on a previous version of this Article. I would also like to thank 
the Oklahoma City University School of Law for supporting my work through the provision of a 
summer research grant. 
1. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-
Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in FEDERALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY 363 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. 
Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 
92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy 
Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007); Heather Gerken, 
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory 
of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005). 
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“interactive,”2 “dynamic,”3 and “polyphonic”4 to capture contemporary 
federalism. 
The federalism scholarship identifies the potential virtues of 
concurrent jurisdiction, noting that it can encourage regulatory 
innovation, learning, and experimentation.
5
 Even so, unproductive 
conflicts between states and the federal government can and do arise.
6
 
That is, federal and state regulatory approaches do not always 
complement each other, and states and local governments will not 
always agree with federal prerogatives. When irreconcilable differences 
arise, the federal courts provide a logical forum for their resolution. 
Although this may seem obvious, it is under-theorized in the 
federalism scholarship
7
 and is far from settled law. In fact, federal 
standing doctrine is notoriously unclear about the extent to which 
governments, and in particular the states, have constitutional standing to 
litigate questions of governmental authority in federal courts.
8
 Courts 
have grappled with state standing in recent cases on pressing social 
                                                     
2. See generally Buzbee, supra note 1. 
3. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006).  
4. See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009). 
5. See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 1, at 288–90. 
6. Some of these conflicts are reflected in the recent trend of state “opposition statutes” (i.e., 
statutes resisting federal policies). Austin Raynor, The New State Sovereignty Movement, 90 IND. 
L.J. 613, 624–34 (2015). 
7. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 538 (2011) 
(arguing that we do not have “doctrines that attempt to recognize, much less negotiate, the 
relationship that is created between state and federal agencies when Congress gives them both 
concurrent authority to implement federal law but is ambiguous about how that authority should be 
allocated”); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 285 (arguing that we lack “rules of engagement” for 
“monitoring federal-state relations” in cooperative governance and arguing “federalism as 
polyphony” provides guidance); see also Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Federalism and the 
Challenges of State Constitutional Contestation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 983, 1004–05 (questioning 
whether federalism principles support state standing to sue when private litigants would lack 
standing). 
8. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing Doctrine Notwithstanding, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
189, 190–99 (2015) (examining the “fragmentation” of governmental standing); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061 (2015) (exploring the pros and cons of 
standing’s fragmentation, as well as the patterns that have emerged from the Supreme Court’s 
opinions over time); Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What Can We Learn When Conservative 
Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 558 (2012) (noting the 
considerable body of scholarship criticizing standing doctrine); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 263 (6th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER] (describing the Court’s state-standing cases as “hard to 
reconcile”). 
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issues such as climate change regulation, health insurance reform, and 
immigration policy. In Massachusetts v. EPA,
9
 states challenged the 
EPA’s decision not to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
from new motor vehicles.
10
 In the wake of new federal health insurance 
legislation, Virginia and other states sought declaratory judgments that 
portions of the new law exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.11 
In 2015, states also challenged federal immigration policies of deferred 
action (or prosecution) for some individuals not legally present in the 
United States.
12
 And in late 2015, states filed lawsuits challenging the 
EPA’s newly released rules governing the emission of GHGs from 
power plants (known as the “Clean Power Plan”).13 
Supreme Court precedent identifies three kinds of state interests 
sufficient to meet Article III’s case or controversy requirement for suit in 
federal court: proprietary interests, sovereignty interests, and quasi-
sovereign interests.
14
 The first type of interest is analogous to private 
common law interests (state property and contracts, for example), which 
have long been recognized as legally justiciable.
15
 Though courts may 
grapple with whether a state has alleged a sufficient injury (one that is 
actual, concrete, and direct), proprietary injuries resemble injuries in 
suits between private parties and do not therefore raise questions unique 
to suits by states and local governments. The doctrinal puzzles grow 
instead out of decisions regarding the other two categories: sovereignty 
and quasi-sovereign interests. 
This is not surprising given that state sovereignty (and therefore 
                                                     
9. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
10. Id. 
11. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Att’y 
Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part sub 
nom. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
12. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 
2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). After the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
preliminary injunction of the federal policy, the Supreme Court granted the federal government’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari and will likely issue a decision in June 2016. Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d 134, 162 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). 
13. See Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/02/22/document_ew_02.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/68PV-LUVY]. After the D.C. Circuit denied the petitioners’ requests for a stay of 
the Clean Power Plan, the petitioners applied for a stay in the Supreme Court. Over the dissent of 
four justices, the Court stayed the Clean Power Plan pending disposition of the appellate court’s 
review and resolution of any review by the Court itself. Order Granting Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, 
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). 
14. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–05 (1982). 
15. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (describing the “traditional common-law cause 
of action” as “at the conceptual core of the case-or-controversy requirement”). 
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quasi-sovereignty) simply cannot mean the same thing today as it did a 
century or more ago. Before the advent of the modern administrative 
state, federal law was less pervasive and less dependent on the 
collaboration of state and local actors for its implementation and 
enforcement. It makes little sense to look to early Supreme Court 
decisions analyzing federal-state conflicts regarding lawmaking 
authority in an age when states and local governments are intimately 
involved in the implementation and enforcement of federal law. Because 
states and localities must bear sizable social and economic costs when 
they agree to participate in federal regulatory schemes, states clearly 
have a concrete interest in litigating questions of governmental power 
before agreeing to shared governance. Moreover, allowing them to do so 
ex ante promotes the efficient resolution of difficult preemption 
questions that might otherwise be litigated piecemeal by private parties 
alleging various injuries. 
Although legal scholars have questioned restrictive doctrines limiting 
state access to federal court,
16
 the literature on constitutional standing 
has not adequately addressed when states have Article III standing to 
challenge federal authority.
17
 This Article aims to fill this gap by 
conceptualizing injuries to state “governance” interests in a way that is 
both consistent with Supreme Court doctrine and grounded in today’s 
multijurisdictional regulatory landscape. To be sure, scholars often 
dismiss standing doctrine as muddled beyond repair, arguing that judges 
manipulate it to reach their preferred ends.
18
 While tension in the case 
law lends support to this claim, it should not silence critical 
commentary. In fact, it should inspire commentary because a doctrinally 
sound, contemporary theory of state standing should be less susceptible 
to judicial manipulation. 
The main argument of the Article is that states should have 
“governance” standing to challenge federal power and action when the 
federal law at issue contemplates an implementation role for state 
governments. Congress will sometimes specifically authorize suits by 
states and others to facilitate enforcement of regulatory schemes—like 
                                                     
16. See, e.g., Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing 
that governments should enjoy implied public rights of action to vindicate states’ administrative and 
institutional interests); Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 442–56 (2013) 
(discussing the federalism implications of the Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, __U.S.__, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding that proponents of a ballot initiative banning same-sex marriage 
lacked standing to defend the initiative)). 
17. Most of the recent commentary surrounding state standing is a response to Massachusetts v. 
EPA. See sources cited infra note 132.  
18. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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the state suit challenging EPA’s decision not to regulate GHG emissions 
in Massachusetts v. EPA. But as Massachusetts v. EPA demonstrates, 
congressional authorization does not always remove standing concerns 
under current doctrine. The approach advocated here would make state 
standing in such cases more straightforward by acknowledging that 
states have been and should be treated differently for purposes of 
standing in certain cases. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I is a historical analysis of 
Supreme Court decisions involving issues of sovereignty. The analysis 
demonstrates that the Court has long recognized the justiciability of 
governance interests. In Part II, close analysis of later and more 
contemporary cases, including Massachusetts v. EPA, reveals that much 
of today’s confusion regarding state standing can be traced to the 
gradual expansion of representative (parens patriae) suits by states suing 
on behalf of their citizens. In order to develop a clear doctrinal approach 
to state standing in suits against the federal government, we must first 
understand how the doctrine regarding representative standing has 
clouded the analysis of standing based on governance interests. 
Part III lays out a new approach grounded in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, but updated to reflect a “post-sovereignty” state-federal 
relationship. The governance approach to state standing allows states to 
challenge federal laws and actions when the federal law underlying the 
challenge contemplates an implementation role for state governments. In 
the modern administrative state, a “sovereign” state government does not 
regulate apart from the federal government in most arenas, but 
constitutional sovereignty nevertheless guarantees that a state can and 
should be accountable to its citizens in how it governs. Because states 
often govern with the federal government under federal administrative 
laws, they have concrete governance interests that flow from this 
modern-day shared sovereignty. They suffer injury to these interests 
when the federal government fails to govern or act according to federal 
law. 
Part III explains how a governance approach to state suits challenging 
federal authority would provide federal courts with a clear, coherent 
approach to state standing—making the doctrine less susceptible to 
manipulation. Instead of analyzing state standing under both the 
traditional injury-in-fact test and the unclear “special solicitude” test that 
Massachusetts v. EPA arguably creates, the governance approach would 
combine the two inquiries. In essence, when a state can show that federal 
action implicates a governance interest, it establishes an Article III 
injury. Part III also examines how the approach facilitates the clear 
resolution of other threshold questions, such as whether the court has 
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federal subject-matter jurisdiction and whether the state plaintiff has a 
federal right of action. Currently, courts tend to overlook these threshold 
questions, which are obscured by overly broad state standing analyses. 
To illustrate the value of the approach, the Article ends with analyses of 
two recent cases: Virginia’s challenge to the Affordable Care Act and 
Texas’s recent challenge to a federal immigration policy regarding 
deferred action. As the administrative state continues to address our 
most pressing social and economic problems, state suits seeking to 
litigate federal authority will only increase. Now is the time to clarify 
when these states have standing under Article III. 
I. THE LITIGATION OF SOVEREIGNTY INTERESTS: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the judicial power to 
the federal courts.
19
 Based on the provision’s language and history, the 
early Court interpreted Article III to limit judicial power to “cases” or 
“controversies,” a requirement that precludes review of hypothetical 
questions and generally prevents the issuance of advisory opinions.
20
 
Article III, Section 2 also specifies that the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls and those in which a State shall be a Party.”21 In 
the First Judiciary Act in 1789, Congress further specified that the Court 
had original and exclusive jurisdiction in all civil controversies between 
states and had original, but not exclusive jurisdiction, in suits “between a 
state and citizens of other states.”22 The Act did not expressly 
contemplate suit against the federal government, although later statutes 
specified that the Court has original (but not exclusive) jurisdiction over 
controversies between the federal government and a state.
23
 
The authors of the most influential historical analysis of state standing 
in modern scholarship contend that Supreme Court precedent does not 
generally support the justiciability of sovereignty (or “governance”) 
interests under Article III.
24
 They argue that the federal courts generally 
                                                     
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
20. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 52–57 (noting the long-held and widely accepted 
view that advisory opinions are unconstitutional and raising questions based on the critical 
commentary surrounding this assumption). 
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
22. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80. 
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
24. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 412 (1995). 
Ann Woolhandler recently reaffirmed this view in light of intervening scholarship. Ann 
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recognized only private common law interests as justiciable.
25
 In their 
view, states were free to enforce their own laws in their own courts, but 
could sue in federal court only when they could allege a traditional 
common law injury to person or property.
26
 
The historical analysis that follows in this part of the Article suggests 
a different reading of this precedent. In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, states did sue to vindicate governance interests in federal 
court. What I call “governance” interests, the Court has called 
“sovereign” or sometimes “quasi-sovereign” interests.27 It has 
recognized them as justiciable under Article III in cases brought by a 
state against another state and in state suits against the federal 
government. Even cases frequently cited to support the nonjusticiability 
thesis prove to be weak bases for a sweeping conclusion that the federal 
courts have always understood these interests as outside Article III’s 
grant of judicial power. 
A.  Early Cases and Interstate Disputes 
Early Supreme Court cases are sometimes read to suggest the Court’s 
reluctance to consider sovereignty claims by state plaintiffs.
28
 In 1831, 
for example, the Court refused to hear the Cherokee Nation’s request to 
enjoin Georgia from enforcing its state laws in Cherokee territory 
recognized by treaty with the United States.
29
 The state had enacted 
various laws authorizing the acquisition and distribution of Cherokee 
lands and otherwise flouting the Tribe’s rights to self-government.30 
Historical accounts illuminate not only the tragic circumstances of this 
                                                     
Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209 (2014). 
25. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 412. 
26. Id. 
27. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02 
(1982). 
28. See id. 
29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Although American Indian Tribes 
have interests as separate sovereigns under federal law, their political and legal relationship with the 
federal government is established by a series of treaties, which recognize the Tribes’ right to self-
determination, as well as a federal trust responsibility over Indian Tribes and territory. Seth Davis, 
Tribal Rights of Action, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 499, 528–29 (2014). Strong arguments may be made 
that Tribes should have access to the federal courts to litigate their sovereignty interests. Id. at 529–
43; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457, 464 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(holding that Tribe had standing based on sovereignty interest in self-government to challenge 
imposition of state tax on slot machines at Tribe’s casino). But because their historical, legal, and 
political relationship with the federal government differs in many ways from the state-federal 
relationship, the historical and doctrinal analyses in this Article do not necessarily extend to Tribes.  
30. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 7–8.  
10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2016  12:49 PM 
2016] STATE STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL AUTHORITY 645 
 
case, but also the precarious political environment in which it was 
brought.
31
 Given the very real concern that a judicial injunction would 
not be enforced, Chief Justice Marshall’s characterization of the 
requested relief as an exercise of “political power” outside the 
judiciary’s “proper province” is hardly surprising.32 Even so, this 
characterization is dicta; his conclusion that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
was based not on the case or controversy requirement, but on an analysis 
that excluded the Cherokee Nation from the phrase “foreign state” in 
Article III.
33
 In addition, two justices dissented, arguing that the Court 
did have jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state laws that violated 
property rights secured to the Tribe by federal treaties.
34
 
Other early decisions regarding the justiciability of sovereignty 
interests must also be placed in historical context. In Mississippi v. 
Johnson
35
 and Georgia v. Stanton,
36
 states challenged the federal 
government’s authority under the Reconstruction Acts following the 
Civil War. In both cases, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
enjoin the executive branch in its enforcement of laws that replaced state 
government with federal military rule.
37
 In Stanton, the Court explained 
that the judicial power does not extend to “the rights of sovereignty, of 
political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate existence as a State,” 
but is instead confined to rights of persons or property traditionally 
litigated by individuals.
38
 
Because this language distinguishes judicial from political power by 
                                                     
31. See, e.g., Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee 
Cases, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 72 (Carole E. Goldberg et al. eds., 2011); JILL NORGREN, THE 
CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND POLITICS (1996); Joseph C. Burke, The 
Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969). One year 
later, the Court did invalidate a Georgia state law as infringing on the Cherokee Nation’s 
sovereignty, but the state simply ignored the ruling, and the federal government did not enforce it. 
See Rennard Strickland & William Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian Law 
and Policy, The Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court Victories, 47 OKLA. L. 
REV. 111, 112–15 (1994) (discussing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). 
32. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. In early cases, the Court often discussed justiciability under 
Article III by distinguishing between “judicial” and “political” power. These cases are the 
precursors to today’s standing and political question doctrines under Article III. See, e.g., Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224–26 (1962) (discussing Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868) as 
precedent relevant to the political question doctrine). 
33. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. 
34. Justice Thompson wrote the dissent, in which Justice Story concurred. Id. at 80 (Thompson, 
J., dissenting). 
35. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867). 
36. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868). 
37. Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 499; Stanton, 73 U.S. at 77. 
38. Stanton, 73 U.S. at 77. 
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reference to individual common law rights, some commentators have 
argued that the early Court required states to allege common law 
injuries, and sovereignty interests were nonjusticiable.
39
 This argument 
is arguably strengthened by the fact that the Court did entertain 
constitutional challenges to Reconstruction legislation in habeas cases 
brought by individuals held pursuant to military authority.
40
 But the 
relief requested in these two kinds of cases was very different; in the 
cases brought by states, the Court was asked to enjoin all executive 
enforcement of two pieces of federal legislation, while in the habeas 
cases, the Court was asked to grant more limited relief. Because a 
declaration that the Reconstruction Acts were unconstitutional in their 
entirety would have provoked a serious political conflict, the justices 
were understandably reluctant to reach the merits of the case.
41
 The 
language suggesting that states could not litigate “rights of sovereignty” 
is therefore deeply rooted in historical context and should not be used to 
support generalizations regarding the justiciability of governance 
interests today. 
Moreover, these cases are simply not representative of the Court’s 
approach to sovereignty interests. States did in fact litigate sovereignty 
interests—primarily in cases involving border disputes. As early as 
1838, in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
42
 the Court exercised its 
original jurisdiction to hear disputes regarding interstate borders, 
reasoning that the authors of the Constitution had such suits in mind in 
giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over disputes between 
states.
43
 The argument that border disputes involve nonjusticiable 
questions of political sovereignty appeared in Chief Justice Taney’s 
                                                     
39. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 418–19; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION 
IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 303 (1985). 
40. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). When the Court was poised to rule on 
the constitutionality of a detention in the South, Congress expressly repealed the Court’s 
jurisdiction—a result that illustrates the political position of the Court at this time. See Ex Parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Congress limited the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 
habeas cases to preserve the terms of Reconstruction and not out of a desire to limit judicial power 
generally. As others have noted, the same Congress expanded the federal courts’ jurisdiction in 
various ways. See Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation 
of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1158–59 (2011). 
41. See Friedman & Delaney, supra note 40, at 1157–59 (describing the political tensions of the 
time). 
42. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838). 
43. Id. at 723–24; see also Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900) (recognizing that the 
Constitution gave the Supreme Court broader jurisdiction over interstate disputes than the common 
law and that this “new branch of jurisdiction seemed to be necessary from the extinguishment of 
diplomatic relations between the states”). 
10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2016  12:49 PM 
2016] STATE STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL AUTHORITY 647 
 
dissenting opinion
44
 and essentially faded over time as the Court 
routinely decided cases involving borders and interstate water 
allocation.
45
 
By 1892, in a dispute between Texas and the United States regarding 
territory in Oklahoma, the Court not only treated interstate border 
disputes as an accepted part of its jurisdiction, but also distinguished 
interstate litigation from suits involving states and private parties, noting 
that the states consented to judicial resolution of intergovernmental 
disputes when they entered into the union.
46
 Moreover, in deciding that 
the case was appropriately brought as a suit in equity rather than law, the 
Court explicitly characterized the dispute as one involving governmental 
authority: “[i]t is not a suit simply to determine the legal title to, and the 
ownership of [lands] . . . . It involves the larger question of 
governmental authority and jurisdiction over that territory.”47 
The intergovernmental litigation of sovereignty interests also 
occurred in cases in which one state sued another to invalidate laws and 
actions that allegedly interfered with the free flow of interstate 
commerce. The Court initially grounded its jurisdiction in the state’s 
own proprietary interests, as well as its interests in representing its 
citizens. When Pennsylvania and Ohio challenged a West Virginia law 
limiting the removal of natural gas from the state, the Court stressed the 
states’ status as consumers of natural gas and as representatives of 
citizen consumers whose use of the resource would be similarly curtailed 
by the West Virginia restriction.
48
 
But what is perhaps most remarkable about this case is that the Court 
was willing to entertain a suit seeking a declaration regarding the 
constitutionality of a state law prior to its application, rather than an 
injunction against specific enforcement of its provisions.
49
 Indeed, in his 
dissent, Justice Brandeis detailed the numerous procedural steps 
(including application to West Virginia’s public service commission) 
                                                     
44. Rhode Island, 37 U.S. at 753 (Taney, J., dissenting). 
45. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922) (exercising original jurisdiction over a 
dispute between two states regarding allocation of water from interstate stream), vacated on other 
grounds, 353 U.S. 953 (1957); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 84–85 (1907) (holding that the 
Court had original jurisdiction over a dispute between Kansas and Colorado regarding the 
appropriation of water from the Arkansas River); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 640 (1892) 
(citing several cases as evidence that the Court’s jurisdiction over border disputes between states is 
a settled question of law).  
46. Texas, 143 U.S. at 646. 
47. Id. at 648.  
48. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591–92 (1923). 
49. Id. at 581. 
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that would precede state enforcement of export restrictions.
50
 Because 
none of these steps had apparently been taken, Justice Brandeis 
characterized the case as one to enjoin “legislation” (rather than 
executive action) by seeking a “general declaration” regarding the state 
law’s constitutionality—an abstract ruling that he argued fell short of the 
case or controversy requirement of Article III.
51
 
Decades later, the Court again concluded that states had standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of a state law under the Commerce 
Clause—in this case, Louisiana’s “first-use” tax on some natural gas 
brought into Louisiana (which ultimately increased the price of such gas 
to out-of-state consumers).
52
 Again, the Court concluded that the states 
had standing as consumers of natural gas (a proprietary interest) and as 
representatives of their consumer citizens.
53
 Though Justice Rehnquist 
dissented, he actually agreed that the Court had original jurisdiction 
under Article III and relevant statutes, but would have declined to 
exercise that jurisdiction as a prudential matter because the states had 
not advanced a sovereignty interest.
54
 He argued that the Court’s original 
jurisdiction should be used only when a state “seeks to vindicate its 
rights as a State, a political entity.”55 Justice Rehnquist’s characterization 
of sovereignty is striking; in his view, questions of political sovereignty 
(now described as states’ “rights”) are not only justiciable—they are the 
questions most worthy of the Court’s original jurisdiction. 
Only a decade later, in Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
56
 a majority of the 
Court again agreed that sovereignty interests are appropriate grounds for 
exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction.57 In deciding to exercise its 
original jurisdiction over Wyoming’s claim that an Oklahoma law 
violated the Commerce Clause, the Court emphasized the sovereign 
interests of both states. In underscoring the “seriousness and dignity” of 
the claim, Justice White noted that Oklahoma, “acting in its sovereign 
capacity,” had passed legislation that limited Wyoming’s ability to 
collect severance taxes from in-state coal companies.
58
 
Moreover, in rejecting the argument that the Court should dismiss the 
                                                     
50. Id. at 611–15 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 610. 
52. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981). 
53. Id. at 737–38. 
54. Id. at 766 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
55. Id. 
56. 502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
57. Id. at 451–52. 
58. Id. at 451. 
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suit because the issues could be litigated (by the coal companies) in 
another forum, Justice White emphasized that no such suit was currently 
pending, and even if it were, Wyoming’s interests as a “sovereign” 
might not be adequately considered.
59
 In addition, he suggested that 
Wyoming’s injury implicated its sovereign interests and that the 
magnitude, or seriousness, of that injury should be assessed not only by 
evaluating the impacts of Oklahoma’s discriminatory legislation, but 
also by considering the impacts of similar laws should other states 
decide to follow Oklahoma’s example.60 The fact that the state plaintiff 
raised a question of governmental authority (in this case, federal 
authority under the Commerce Clause) actually helped the state 
overcome objections that its alleged injury to tax revenues was both 
indirect and trivial (less than one percent of collected taxes).
61
 
Indeed, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia highlighted the 
attenuated nature of the alleged injury: though Oklahoma utilities had 
certainly bought less Wyoming coal since the state law’s enactment, that 
fact did not necessarily establish that Wyoming coal companies had sold 
less coal (and that Wyoming had therefore suffered a loss in severance 
tax revenues).
62
 But in contrast to the majority, Justice Scalia analyzed 
state standing just as he would the standing of a private party, giving no 
weight to the governance interests asserted or implicated by the case
63—
a critical and continuing tension in contemporary Supreme Court 
opinions regarding state standing. An approach to state standing that 
explicitly recognizes governance interests would help explain decisions 
like Wyoming v. Oklahoma and address “floodgate” objections to 
expanding state standing, such as those raised by Justice Scalia in his 
dissent, by acknowledging that state standing is and should be grounded 
in different principles of justiciability. 
                                                     
59. Id. at 452.  
60. Id. at 453 (“[T]he practical effect of [Oklahoma’s] statute must be evaluated not only by 
considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute 
may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of the other States and what effect would arise if 
not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
61. Id. at 448–49, 452–53. 
62. Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
63. Id. at 465–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, in which he argued that Wyoming had failed to allege facts 
sufficient to show an injury in fact under Article III, and if it had met this burden, he would still 
decline to exercise the Court’s original jurisdiction for prudential reasons. 
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B.  State Challenges to Federal Power in the Twentieth Century 
Early in the twentieth century, the Court concluded it lacked 
jurisdiction in cases in which states sought declarations that federal law 
exceeded constitutional authority. In 1923, in Massachusetts v. Mellon,
64
 
Massachusetts challenged a federal law that granted states federal 
funding if they cooperated with the federal government in efforts to 
improve maternal and infant health.
65
 The state argued that Congress had 
violated the state’s rights under the Tenth Amendment by forcing it to 
choose either to yield some of the authority (reserved to it under the 
amendment) or to lose the federal funds appropriated under the act.
66
 
The Court labeled the question presented as “political” and outside the 
judicial power conferred by Article III, quoting older cases, such as 
Georgia v. Stanton and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, for the proposition 
that it may not render abstract opinions on the constitutionality of state 
or federal laws.
67
 Other cases from this time period appear to use the 
same logic to resolve similar state challenges to federal law.
68
 
But a close reading of these cases reveals that they turn more on the 
merits of the states’ claims than on the Court’s unwillingness to resolve 
governance conflicts. In Mellon, though the Court dismissed the case for 
“want of jurisdiction” and expressly stated that it was not deciding the 
constitutional questions, it actually did decide the state’s Tenth 
Amendment question.
69
 Rather than framing its analysis in terms of 
constitutional jurisdiction, the Court inquired into the “nature of the 
right” asserted by the state and analyzed what effect, if any, the federal 
law had on that right.
70
 In disposing of the case, the Court expressly 
acknowledged the state’s arguments in support of its Tenth Amendment 
claim, particularly its contention that the federal law burdened the state 
by attaching conditions to federal funding: 
But what burden is imposed upon the states, unequally or 
otherwise? Certainly there is none, unless it be the burden of 
taxation, and that falls upon their inhabitants, who are within the 
taxing power of Congress as well as that of the states where they 
                                                     
64. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 479–80. 
67. Id. at 483–84. 
68. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1927); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 331 
(1926). 
69. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480. 
70. Id. at 482. 
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reside. Nor does the statute require the states to do or to yield 
anything. If Congress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of 
tempting them to yield, that purpose may be effectively 
frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding.
71
 
The Court then concluded that the federal law imposed no burden on the 
states because it did not operate without state consent—foreshadowing 
later cases under the Spending Clause.
72
 In effect, the Court did decide 
the question of the statute’s constitutionality. 
Other cases follow a similar path. In Florida v. Mellon,
73
 the Court 
held that it lacked Article III jurisdiction over Florida’s challenge to a 
federal tax on inheritances, but in doing so, it also declared that the 
federal law was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing power 
under the Court’s precedent.74 The Court further explained that, under 
the Supremacy Clause, state law must yield and if the federal law 
interfered with state authority or indirectly caused loss of tax revenue, 
“that is a contingency which affords no ground for judicial relief.”75 The 
Court also characterized the state’s alleged injury to its tax revenues—
premised on the theory that the federal law would cause taxpayers to 
remove their property from the state—as “speculative” and “indirect.”76 
In other words, the state’s claim that the federal government intruded on 
the state’s regulatory authority lacked merit, and any argument that the 
federal law somehow injured the state failed to state a valid claim for 
judicial relief. 
Similarly, in New Jersey v. Sargent,
77
 the Court held that the state had 
not presented an Article III case or controversy in challenging parts of 
the Federal Water Power Act as an unconstitutional exercise of authority 
over intrastate waters, but it did so after discussing the reach of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power and the absence of a true conflict 
with state authority.
78
 The state objected to the imposition of a federal 
licensing and permitting scheme for the use of navigable waters in the 
                                                     
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 483. Not surprisingly, in writing for the majority in South Dakota v. Dole, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist cited Massachusetts v. Mellon in support of the proposition that state sovereignty is not 
violated under the Tenth Amendment when a state may simply decline federal funds and thereby 
avoid the federal conditions attached to such funds. 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987). 
73. 273 U.S. 12 (1927). 
74. Id. at 17. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 18. 
77. 269 U.S. 328 (1926). 
78. Id. at 337 (summarizing “settled” doctrine regarding Congress’s power to regulate navigable 
waters and characterizing the states’ power over waters within their borders as “subordinate”). 
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state, but no specific license or permit was at issue and the state had not 
alleged facts showing that the federal act interfered with any state law or 
action that the state wished to take.
79
 Like Massachusetts v. Mellon and 
Florida v. Mellon, the state had failed to show a true conflict regarding 
federal-state authority over relevant activities or a direct injury to the 
state itself as a regulated entity. Using modern legal concepts, we might 
say today that the states in these cases failed to state a claim upon which 
a court might grant relief.
80
 
Language regarding the Court’s “lack of jurisdiction” must therefore 
be placed in its historical context.
81
 The Court did not characterize its 
disposition in terms of failure to state a valid claim because these cases 
predate important legal developments, including the Supreme Court’s 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Prior to this 
time, in the absence of a federal statutory or constitutional right, the right 
to sue in federal court depended on the existence of an appropriate “form 
of proceeding” taken from state law in cases at law and English chancery 
practice in cases in equity.
82
 In order to have a “cause of action,” a 
plaintiff’s case had to conform to one of these forms of proceeding.83 
Each form of proceeding had its own procedural rules and prescribed the 
                                                     
79. Id. at 338–40; see also Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 162 (1922) (holding that Court lacked 
jurisdiction, in part, because no “right” of the state was yet affected by application of challenged 
federal law). 
80. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), 
with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted). 
81. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article 
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 180 (1992) (“The development of standing limitations in the early part of 
the twentieth century was indeed a novelty, in the sense that no separate body of standing law 
existed before this period.”). 
82. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in 
Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609, 667–77 (2015); see 
also Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made 
Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 258–89 (2010) (arguing that nineteenth-century 
federal courts applied uniform, non-state equity principles based on English chancery sources—at 
least with regard to remedies and procedures); John Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in 
Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 24 (2013) (arguing that the federal courts 
adopted English equity practices). In 1851, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the “common 
law of chancery” in cases in equity. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 
How.) 518, 563 (1851). Of course, in 1945, the Court made clear that, in federal diversity cases, 
state law would apply to substantive rights even when the plaintiff seeks equitable relief. Guar. 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
83. Bellia & Clark, supra note 82, at 632–34. The forms of proceeding specified remedies for 
various injuries. For example, to recover damages for personal property taken by force, the 
appropriate form of proceeding at common law would be one for an action of trespass vi et armis. 
Id. at 633. If a plaintiff could not find a form of proceeding that provided the remedy for a given 
injury, the plaintiff had no cause of action and therefore no access to the courts. 
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relief, or remedy, available.
84
 Not surprisingly, federal courts often 
spoke in terms of “jurisdiction” or the scope of judicial power when 
analyzing whether a plaintiff had a “right” to sue—that is, when 
analyzing whether the plaintiff’s case fit an appropriate form of 
proceeding.
85
 
Moreover, before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the merger of law and equity into a uniform “civil 
action,” federal judges would have understood the concept of 
“jurisdiction” to refer to either legal or equitable jurisdiction. This 
distinction is critical to understanding the relevance of premerger cases 
to Article III doctrines of justiciability. Before the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure erased the legal distinction between law and equity, the 
Court’s threshold “jurisdictional” determination turned on whether the 
plaintiff alleged a cause of action that fit a recognized form of 
proceeding or judicial remedy.
86
 When states sought access to federal 
court to challenge federal power, they filed bills in equity seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief.
87
 A federal court could not exercise its 
jurisdiction (legal or equitable) unless the plaintiff state could establish a 
cause of action by fitting its grievance and desired remedy into a form of 
proceeding recognized by the federal courts. Indeed, even in Georgia v. 
Stanton, a case often cited to support the proposition that states lack 
standing to litigate sovereignty interests, the Court dismissed the case 
because an injury to political rights did not establish a cause of action 
                                                     
84. Id. at 634. 
85. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 337 (1926) (concluding that the allegations in 
the bill in equity “do not suffice as a basis for invoking an exercise of judicial power”); 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (framing its jurisdictional inquiry as one about 
the “right of the state” and how that right is affected by the federal statute); see also Anthony J. 
Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 827 (2004) (arguing that 
Massachusetts v. Mellon “was only one of several cases decided before the promulgation of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that today we characterize as ‘standing’ cases, but that the Court in 
fact decided under traditional equitable principles”). 
86. See Bellia, supra note 85, at 826 (“Standing did not emerge as a question distinct from 
whether the plaintiff had a cause of action under a recognized form of proceeding until the merger 
of law and equity in the federal system and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
Although other scholars have also argued that constitutional standing doctrine is a twentieth-century 
invention, there is obviously some disagreement in the scholarship. Ann Woolhandler and Michael 
Collins have argued that a discernable doctrine regarding state standing exists in early Supreme 
Court cases. See generally Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24. Ann Woolhandler and Caleb 
Nelson have similarly argued that early cases demonstrate a standing doctrine hostile to the 
litigation of public rights by private citizens. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History 
Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 694–711 (2004). 
87. See, e.g., Sargent, 269 U.S. at 330 (considering a bill in equity seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief). 
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under the appropriate form of proceeding in an equitable action for an 
injunction.
88
 In other words, the Court concluded that it lacked equitable 
jurisdiction.
89
 
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some of 
its precedents conflate questions of Article III standing with the merits 
question of whether the plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief.
90
 
Recent cases suggest that the modern Court is inclined to apply a default 
rule that distinguishes the two analyses: standing involves a 
determination of whether the court has the “constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case,” whereas the validity of an alleged cause of action 
requires a merits determination that does not raise jurisdictional issues.
91
 
Early nineteenth and twentieth-century precedents must therefore be 
interpreted today in ways that are consistent with contemporary doctrine. 
To determine whether the Court actually dismissed a state’s case for lack 
of Article III jurisdiction requires a close reading of the Court’s analysis. 
In many cases, the Court analyzes the reach of federal power and 
essentially decides the merits of the state’s claim. 
Furthermore, even if these early cases suggest an arguable reluctance 
by the Court to decide regulatory conflicts between a state and the 
federal government, they fall short of demonstrating that the Court never 
exercised jurisdiction over such conflicts. Indeed, in one early twentieth-
century case, the Court expressly decided that it had equitable 
jurisdiction over a state-federal conflict. In Missouri v. Holland,
92
 
Missouri brought suit to enjoin a federal game warden from enforcing 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
93
 The state alleged that the Act 
                                                     
88. The state asked the Court to enjoin the federal executive branch based on the state’s right to 
exist—a request that did not fit neatly into an equitable action for an injunction:  
[A]ccording to the course of proceeding under this head in equity, in order to entitle the party 
to the remedy, a case must be presented appropriate for the exercise of judicial power; the 
rights in danger, as we have seen, must be rights of persons or property, not merely political 
rights, which do not belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity.  
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 75–76 (1868). 
89. Id. 
90. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88 
(2014); Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2361–2363 (2011). 
91. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4 (noting that the “absence of a valid (as opposed to 
arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or 
constitutional power to adjudicate the case” (internal quotations omitted)); see also John F. Preis, 
How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies, and Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
849, 887–94 (2015) (arguing that the cause-of-action and jurisdictional inquiries continue to be 
related in some contexts, such as determinations regarding state sovereign immunity and statutory 
standing analyses). 
92. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
93. Id. at 430–31. 
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unconstitutionally invaded the regulatory authority reserved to the states 
under the Tenth Amendment.
94
 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes 
acknowledged the state’s asserted proprietary interest as owner of wild 
game within its borders, but emphasized a different basis for jurisdiction. 
He indicated that the state could bring the case to adjudicate its right to 
control a resource over which it claimed ownership in its “sovereign 
capacity.”95 Although it is impossible to know why the Court was 
willing to expressly reach the merits in Holland, the existence of a state 
statute recognizing state title in migratory birds arguably presented a 
clearer regulatory conflict.
96
 
In any event, state standing to adjudicate the proper division of 
federal-state authority continued and—much like state standing to 
challenge other states’ authority under the Commerce Clause—it 
evolved over time to reach new questions of intergovernmental 
authority. For example, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court 
granted South Carolina leave to challenge provisions of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) as exceeding federal constitutional authority.
97
 The 
Court quickly dismissed many of the state’s constitutional arguments on 
the ground that certain constitutional protections (such as those found in 
the Due Process and Bill of Attainder Clauses) do not extend to states.
98
 
The only remaining question was whether Congress exceeded its 
authority under the Fifteenth Amendment (which prohibits racial 
discrimination in voting) in passing legislation that imposed various 
requirements on certain states and localities.
99
 The Court reached the 
merits, holding that Congress did not exceed its constitutional 
authority.
100
 
                                                     
94. Id. at 431. 
95. Id. at 432. Justice Holmes also characterized the state’s rights as “quasi sovereign,” but did 
not elaborate on what the term means. See id. at 431. I discuss the Supreme Court decisions that 
refer to quasi-sovereign rights in Part II infra. 
96. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. Justice Holmes’s opinion that federal law could constitutionally 
preempt state authority in this area predates later cases in which he joined the Court in holding it 
lacked jurisdiction. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921–1920, 1986 
DUKE L.J. 65, 125 & nn.327–28 (noting that the Court followed Georgia v. Stanton and Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia in Massachusetts v. Mellon despite Justice Holmes’s “intervening” opinion in 
Missouri v. Holland). 
97. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 382 U.S. 898 (1965) (mem.) (granting South Carolina leave to 
file in Court’s original jurisdiction). Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart indicated that they would 
not have granted leave to file. 
98. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
99. Id. at 324. 
100. Id. at 325. 
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Scholars have attempted to distinguish Katzenbach from earlier cases, 
such as Massachusetts v. Mellon, that the Court dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds by characterizing the state’s interest in 
Katzenbach as unique—either because the Constitution specifically 
recognizes the state interest or because private parties are not likely to 
have standing to vindicate it.
101
 But it is difficult to see why the specific 
state interest in elections is determinative. Although the Constitution 
acknowledges that states have regulatory authority over elections, it also 
expressly acknowledges that Congress has the authority to preempt state 
laws in this area.
102
 Furthermore, the second argument—that states have 
standing because private litigants may not—has not been identified as a 
basis for state standing in the Court’s jurisprudence. It is a normative 
argument that partially justifies state standing in cases like Katzenbach, 
but it does not fully theorize when states should have standing. At best, it 
is a necessary condition, but no authority suggests that it is a sufficient 
condition for state standing under Article III. 
Moreover, under the reading of Massachusetts v. Mellon that I 
propose, there is no need to distinguish Katzenbach. The preclearance 
requirements imposed on states under the VRA forced covered states to 
submit to significant federal oversight and therefore required state 
action. The Act required certain states and localities to seek federal 
approval of changes to local laws and to take various other actions that 
they did not wish to take.
103
 In contrast, the federal laws challenged by 
states in Mellon and contemporaneous cases did not require state action. 
In those cases, the states either alleged no injury (e.g., Massachusetts 
had not chosen to participate in the federal scheme to improve maternal 
and infant health)
104
 or an indirect injury (e.g., Florida’s feared loss of 
revenue as a result of a federal tax on inheritances).
105
 Even though the 
Court framed its discussion in terms of jurisdiction, it nevertheless 
resolved the constitutional challenges to federal authority raised by the 
states. Though the Court’s modern standing inquiry requires that a 
plaintiff establish an injury in fact, this was not established doctrine in 
the early twentieth century. In these early cases, the state’s lack of injury 
is a conclusion on the merits, not on the threshold issue of standing. 
As the federal administrative state and budget grew in the latter half 
                                                     
101. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 
858–65 (2012). 
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
103. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 319–20. 
104. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923). 
105. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927). 
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of the twentieth century, states more frequently challenged federal 
authority as unconstitutionally coercive, and their standing to do so went 
unquestioned. These Tenth Amendment challenges generally fall into 
two categories: challenges to conditions on federal funding designed to 
influence state policy and challenges to federal laws that direct state 
officials in the executive or legislative branches to administer or enact 
federal laws.
106
 For example, in South Dakota v. Dole,
107
 the state 
(unsuccessfully) challenged the conditioning of federal highway funds 
on the adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one.
108
 Recently, 
states (successfully) challenged federal conditions on funding tied to the 
expansion of Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act.
109
 State standing has also been unremarkable in cases, such as New 
York v. United States
110
 and FERC v. Mississippi,
111
 where states have 
claimed that the federal government is unconstitutionally 
“commandeering” state officials into the service of the federal 
government by forcing them to enact or administer federal laws and 
policies.
112
 
Given this more recent history, it is hardly surprising that when the 
Court recently decided to revisit the constitutionality of preclearance 
provisions of the VRA, Chief Justice Roberts, in writing for the 
majority, did not even mention Article III or address whether the local 
government that brought the suit had standing.
113
 In fact, this case goes 
                                                     
106. There is a third category of cases challenging federal power under the Tenth Amendment: 
cases in which states challenge federal authority to regulate states qua states, that is, in the same 
way it regulates private parties. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (challenge to 
federal law denying income tax exemption for interest on certain state and local bonds); Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (challenge to federal overtime and 
minimum-wage requirements applied to state and local entities). State standing is less controversial 
in these cases because the state’s claim looks like that of a private party. 
107. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
108. Id. at 205. 
109. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 
110. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
111. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
112. New York, 505 U.S. at 202. Woolhandler and Collins distinguish cases like New York v. 
United States on the ground that the contested federal law is acting directly on “state machinery.” 
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 510. This factual distinction leads to their normative 
argument: state standing is appropriate in these cases because it reinforces the federalism norm that 
states and the federal government “act independently.” Id. But this argument ignores regulatory 
reality: states and the federal government do not act independently in many areas. Moreover, the 
line between acting directly on “state machinery” and acting in cooperation with state regulatory 
machinery is impossible to draw. 
113. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). The coverage formula determines which 
states and localities must seek federal approval of changes in election laws. 
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much further than Katzenbach because, as Justice Ginsburg argued in 
her dissent, the majority decided the case by looking at how the Act’s 
“coverage formula” applies generally, rather than focusing on the 
Alabama county that brought the case.
114
 The Court’s willingness to 
consider a facial challenge to the statute allowed one county to 
adjudicate the interests of nonparties.
115
 The fact that Chief Justice 
Roberts did not recognize this as a separate Article III concern suggests 
that state litigation of governance interests is an accepted part of the 
federal courts’ role today.116 
The reality is that federal courts have been hearing these kinds of 
cases—brought by states and localities challenging federal power—for 
some time.
117
 At one point, state standing to litigate Tenth Amendment 
issues had become so accepted that some federal courts of appeals 
refused to hear Tenth Amendment claims brought by individuals on the 
theory that such claims involved injuries to states’ rights.118 Although 
these courts relied heavily on an old case in which the Supreme Court 
refused to hear a Tenth Amendment challenge by private power 
companies, they also bolstered their conclusions with prudential 
standing analyses.
119
 In holding that only states had standing to litigate 
                                                     
114. Id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Embedded in the traditional rules governing 
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be 
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied 
unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.” (citation omitted)). 
115. Id. at 2621–22 (stating that Shelby County sought “a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) 
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional”).  
116. Facial challenges have long been the exception in standing jurisprudence—reserved 
essentially for First Amendment challenges based on freedom of speech. Interestingly, however, a 
body of constitutional scholarship recognizes the Court’s willingness to decide facial challenges in 
cases questioning the extent of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause—cases brought by 
individual litigants. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 
1456–57 (2013) (discussing facial challenges based on a structural right, e.g., the Tenth 
Amendment); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 907 
(2005) (discussing the Court’s willingness to decide facial challenges to Commerce Clause 
legislation). 
117. See, e.g., Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that Wyoming had standing because federal agency interpretation of regulation would 
“interfere[] with Wyoming’s ability to enforce its legal code”); Alaska v. Dep’t of Transp., 868 F.2d 
441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that state had standing based on sovereignty interest to challenge 
federal agency orders that preempted state consumer protection laws). The governance approach I 
propose in Part III would actually stop short of granting state standing in these two examples. I note 
these cases only as examples of state litigation of sovereignty interests in the lower courts. 
118. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 216 (2011) (citing circuit court cases); Mountain 
States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Only the State has standing to 
press claims aimed at protecting its sovereign powers under the Tenth Amendment.”). 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 527–28 (8th Cir. 2009) (following Tenn. 
Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1939), but noting that the court’s decision is 
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questions of federalism, courts noted that their decisions furthered the 
principle that a party may not establish Article III standing by asserting 
the legal rights of third parties.
120
 In this view, if individuals can 
challenge federal power by asserting states’ sovereignty interests, they 
may force the federal courts to decide governance issues that no state 
wishes to decide and that states are generally in the best position to 
litigate.
121
 
In 2011, in Bond v. United States,
122
 the Supreme Court rejected this 
approach to standing in Tenth Amendment cases, holding that 
individuals may challenge federal law as an unconstitutional interference 
with state sovereignty provided they satisfy the Article III requirements 
of injury, causation and redressability.
123
 Justice Kennedy, writing for a 
unanimous Court, emphasized the individual liberty interests protected 
by the Constitution’s vertical division of authority between the federal 
government and the states.
124
 Although he stressed the individual interest 
in this vertical allocation of power, he did so against a clear background 
assumption that states also have standing to bring constitutional 
challenges to federal laws that interfere with their sovereignty 
interests.
125
 Indeed, because individuals must demonstrate their own 
concrete, particular injury, along with causation and redressability, 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that, in some cases, a state might be “the 
only entity capable of demonstrating the requisite injury.”126 The critical 
point for purposes of state standing analysis is that the Court in Bond 
treated state standing based on sovereignty interests as uncontroversial. 
II. SEPARATING SUITS BASED ON SOVEREIGNTY 
INTERESTS FROM REPRESENTATIVE SUITS 
If the Supreme Court has a long history of permitting states to litigate 
                                                     
consistent with a prudential standing analysis). 
120. Id. 
121. Costle, 630 F.2d at 761 (noting the reasons for the prudential limitation on third-party 
standing). 
122. 564 U.S. 211 (2011). 
123. Id. at 225. 
124. Id. at 220–24. 
125. This assumption is clear in his description of an individual’s interest in federalism as 
additional to the states’ interests: “[t]he limitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter 
of rights belonging only to the States. . . . Fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the States 
alone to vindicate.” Id. at 222 (emphasis added). 
126. Id. at 225; see also Huq, supra note 116, at 1515 (arguing that, in federalism cases, state 
standing is more consistent with Article III principles than individual standing). 
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sovereignty interests, why have the federal courts struggled to articulate 
doctrinal bases for state standing in recent cases, such as those 
challenging federal health insurance legislation and federal 
administrative action in the environmental and immigration contexts? 
The answer to this question turns in part on how the concept of quasi-
sovereign interests developed in twentieth-century opinions regarding 
state standing. 
Early cases recognize a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in suing on 
behalf of its citizens in limited contexts, namely, in situations where an 
interstate nuisance that originates outside the state threatens the well-
being of the state’s citizens.127 Because states had relinquished the right 
to use force or diplomacy when they entered the federal union, they 
needed a forum in which to settle these interstate disputes. Jurisdiction in 
the federal courts, particularly original jurisdiction in the Supreme 
Court, was part of the founding bargain; states would cede some 
sovereign prerogatives when they agreed to a federal union, but they 
would be able to litigate interstate disputes in federal court.
128
 
But in 1982, the Court greatly expanded the representative (or parens 
patriae) suit in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
129
 a case that 
involved a federal statutory scheme with a significant administrative role 
for the states. In Puerto Rico, the Court recognized a state’s quasi-
sovereign interest in securing for its citizens the benefits of federal laws 
generally.
130
 Because of the tremendous increase in federal statutory law 
by the middle of the twentieth century, this subtle doctrinal move 
arguably supports state representative standing to enforce the benefits of 
most, if not all, federal laws. The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA drew 
from this line of precedent and created further confusion by attempting 
to reconcile it with the Court’s individual standing requirements of 
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.
131
 
This Part makes the argument that we cannot understand the state 
interests that support standing today without understanding how the 
concept of quasi-sovereignty changed in response to the growing 
administrative state. It begins by tracing the doctrinal development of 
the concept of quasi-sovereign interests from its origins to the Court’s 
                                                     
127. See Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 673–74 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that the 
early representative state suits involved disputes over water allocation and interstate pollution). 
128. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 16–17 (noting the recognition by delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention of the need for the federal judiciary to resolve interstate disputes). 
129. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
130. Id. at 608. 
131. 549 U.S. 497, 521–26 (2007). 
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decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. The requirement that a state allege a 
quasi-sovereign interest began as a tool designed to limit the Court’s 
original jurisdiction in interstate nuisance cases. As federal law grew in 
an effort to reach various economic and social problems, the Court 
adapted the concept of quasi-sovereignty to include a state’s interest in 
securing the benefits of federal law for its citizens. 
The Massachusetts Court used this capacious understanding of quasi-
sovereignty to justify “special solicitude” for states in analyzing 
standing, but quasi-sovereignty’s confused doctrinal legacy makes the 
majority’s decision difficult to understand and apply. Legal scholars, 
practitioners, and judges continue to debate exactly what this “special 
solicitude” is and when it is triggered.132 But to date, no one has 
scrutinized the historical development of core concepts, such as quasi-
sovereignty, in the cases relied on by the Massachusetts majority. As the 
following Section demonstrates, the confusion did not begin with 
Massachusetts. It has a much deeper history beginning with interstate 
public nuisance cases and ending with Puerto Rico’s suit to vindicate its 
citizens’ interests under federal law. This Part sheds much-needed light 
on what the majority’s opinion means and how it should be applied in 
future cases. 
                                                     
132. See, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 
2051, 2079 (2011) (arguing that states should have standing to sue federal government based on 
their sovereign interests); Kirsten H. Engel, State Standing in Climate Change Lawsuits, J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 233 (2011) (arguing that the Massachusetts Court should have based its 
standing analysis solely on parens patriae doctrine); Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater 
Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1773 (2008) (arguing that states have special standing as parens 
patriae under pre-Massachusetts precedent); Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 281–83 (2009) (arguing that Massachusetts allows states standing as 
parens patriae to vindicate generalized injuries when individual citizens would not have standing); 
Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RES. & 
ENVTL. L. 273, 318–20 (2007) (arguing that the Massachusetts Court should have based standing 
analysis on California’s sovereign interest in enacting its own emissions standards under CAA 
§ 209(b)(1)); Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of 
Public Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 836–42 (2009) (arguing states should have standing to sue 
federal government when citizens suffer injury to a public good); Sarah Zdeb, Note, From Georgia 
v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming 
Plaintiffs, 96 GEO. L.J. 1059 (2008) (arguing that states should be able to sue the federal 
government as parens patriae in climate change litigation). 
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A.  Quasi-Sovereign Interests and the Representative (Parens Patriae) 
Suit 
1.  Early Twentieth-Century Cases and the Origins of Quasi-
Sovereignty 
A state suing in its representative capacity, on behalf of its citizens, is 
frequently said to be suing in its capacity as parens patriae, which 
means “parent of his or her country.”133 This concept originated in 
England as a means of invoking the prerogative of the king, or 
sovereign.
134
 For example, when a charitable bequest would fail for want 
of a clear beneficiary or because of an illegal purpose, the king as parens 
patriae had the right to dispose of the funds according to the public 
interest.
135
 The king also served as parens patriae in matters affecting 
the rights of individuals otherwise unable to represent their own interests 
(such as minors or individuals with mental disabilities).
136
 
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court acknowledged this 
history and recognized the people—represented through their respective 
legislatures—as the sovereign equivalent of the English crown: 
When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives 
of the crown devolved upon the people of the states. And this 
power still remains with them, except so far as they have 
delegated a portion of it to the Federal government. The 
sovereign will is made known to us by legislative 
enactment. . . . The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
137
 
In other words, the idea of “parens patriae” is synonymous with 
sovereignty, which inheres in the state and federal governments. But it is 
also tied to specific ends, namely, the protection of the public interest 
and care for “those who cannot protect themselves.”138 
Given this understanding, the idea of the state acting as parens 
patriae in the early twentieth century appears to overlap considerably 
                                                     
133. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014). 
134. Wheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 55, 77 (1850). 
135. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 
57 (1890). 
136. Id. at 57–58. See generally Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens 
Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). 
137. Wheeler, 50 U.S. at 78. 
138. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 57; see also Michael Malina & 
Michael D. Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 NW. 
U. L. REV. 193, 197–202 (1970) (tracing the history of the royal prerogative). 
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with the concept of a state’s police power.139 Both concepts are 
expressions of the sovereign’s power to govern in the public interest. As 
the Court articulated it in 1894, a state’s police power “include[s] 
everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and to 
justify the destruction or abatement . . . of whatever may be regarded as 
a public nuisance.”140 Historically, only the sovereign, or king, could 
bring an action to abate a public nuisance.
141
 Of course, to abate an 
interstate public nuisance, that is, a nuisance originating in another state, 
a state could not seek redress in its own courts, nor could it use 
diplomatic or military powers to resolve the problem. Not surprisingly, 
the Supreme Court recognized interstate nuisance cases as proper cases 
over which to exercise federal jurisdiction.
142
 
These cases were suits in equity invoking the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction. The Court was understandably worried about the 
possibility of states invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction in their 
capacities as parens patriae whenever actions occurring in another state 
had an adverse effect on their citizens’ interests. To ensure that its 
original jurisdiction was not overwhelmed by such cases, at the turn of 
the twentieth century, the Court made clear that it would look beyond 
the named parties to ensure that the case presented a controversy 
                                                     
139. One early treatise includes citations to Supreme Court cases discussing the states’ police 
power in an entry on the “doctrine of parens patriae.” HEMAN W. CHAPLIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
FEDERAL LAW AS IN DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 267 n.3 (1917). Courts and commentators 
have often characterized the twentieth-century development of the parens patriae lawsuit by state 
plaintiffs as diverging from or greatly expanding upon earlier cases. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard 
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); Malina & Blechman, supra note 138, at 202. But nineteenth-
century language regarding sovereignty and state power suggests that courts had already begun 
harmonizing the English concept with ideas of popular sovereignty. 
140. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). In Lawton, the Court listed various state actions 
that had been held to be within the state police power. Id. Among the listed actions are examples of 
state actions historically falling within its role as parens patriae. Id. (noting as permissible state 
action “the compulsory vaccination of children [and] the confinement of the insane or those 
afflicted with contagious diseases”).  
141. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *219 (noting that—with few exceptions—a 
public nuisance action must be brought by “the king in his public capacity of supreme governor, and 
pater-familias of the kingdom”). 
142. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (exercising original jurisdiction in suit 
by Wyoming to enjoin diversion of interstate water by Colorado); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 
U.S. 230 (1907) (exercising original jurisdiction in suit by Georgia to enjoin copper companies from 
emitting “noxious” gas into Georgia); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (exercising original 
jurisdiction in suit by Kansas to enjoin diversion of river water by Colorado); Missouri v. Illinois, 
180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (exercising original jurisdiction over Missouri’s suit to enjoin discharge 
into Mississippi River by the Sanitary District of Chicago). Interstate water disputes arising under 
interstate compacts continue to be the most common cases over which the Court exercises its 
original jurisdiction.  
10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2016  12:49 PM 
664 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:637 
 
between two states as required by the Constitution.
143
 In Louisiana v. 
Texas, the Court dismissed a suit by Louisiana seeking to enjoin a Texas 
health official’s implementation of quarantine regulations so as to 
impose an embargo on interstate commerce between Texas and New 
Orleans.
144
 The Court held that the state may not bring a parens patriae 
suit to vindicate its citizens’ interests because the original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to controversies between states.
145
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that allowing 
representative suits by one state against another state would undermine 
states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suit by citizens 
of another state.
146
 
The Court’s interest in limiting its original jurisdiction may also be 
the reason that, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., Justice Holmes 
emphasized Georgia’s quasi-sovereign interest when it sought to enjoin 
the emission of “noxious” air pollutants from copper companies in 
Tennessee.
147
 In addition to ensuring the case was a suitable one for the 
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the Court had to ensure that it 
exercised its equitable jurisdiction according to established principles 
governing equitable remedies—including the principle that injunctive 
relief is inappropriate if an adequate legal remedy exists.
148
 To justify 
granting Georgia’s request for an injunction, Justice Holmes emphasized 
the state’s quasi-sovereign interests: 
This is a suit by a state for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-
sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent 
of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air 
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its 
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants 
shall breathe pure air.
149
 
He then described the state’s interests as a private property owner as 
“merely a makeweight.”150 
This emphasis on a state’s quasi-sovereign rights in “all the earth and 
                                                     
143. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
144. Id. at 23. 
145. Id. at 19. 
146. Id. at 16; see also id. at 25 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that a state may not “even with 
[its citizens’] consent, make their case its case and compel the offending state and its authorities to 
appear as defendants in an action brought in this court”). 
147. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236. 
148. Id. at 237. 
149. Id.  
150. Id. 
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air” within its borders helped support the Court’s decision not to engage 
in the typical balancing of interests required for injunctive relief.
151
 
Recognizing that federal jurisdiction in the courts is the logical 
alternative to the force surrendered by states when they entered the 
union, Justice Holmes emphasized that states “did not sink to the 
position of private owners subject to one system of private law.”152 
Rather, the state had a “sovereign” right to protect its natural resources 
even if out-of-state interests suffer “possible disaster” as a result.153 
The notion of quasi-sovereignty therefore began as a means of 
limiting a state cause of action in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Based 
on their status as parens patriae, states could invoke the Court’s original 
(and sometimes exclusive) jurisdiction to seek equitable relief for 
injuries to their citizens by out-of-state defendants, but only if a quasi-
sovereign interest in “earth and air” were at stake. This interpretation is 
bolstered by the fact that the Court was less troubled by the exercise of 
its appellate jurisdiction in parens patriae suits brought by states or state 
officials. For example, the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over a 
state’s Tenth Amendment challenge to a law facilitating the conversion 
of state building and loan associations into federal savings and loan 
associations.
154
 In doing so, the Court noted the state’s quasi-sovereign 
interest in governing corporations created under state law and its 
separate status as “parens patriae, acting in a spirit of benevolence for 
the welfare of its citizens,” including the shareholders of corporations.155 
Only three years later, the Court explicitly noted its concern in 
allowing parens patriae suits to be heard in the Court’s original 
jurisdiction in a representative suit filed by Oklahoma to enforce the 
liability of a shareholder of an insolvent bank over which the state bank 
commissioner had control.
156
 The Court quoted Tennessee Copper’s 
quasi-sovereign language, but emphasized that quasi-sovereign interests 
do not include all representative cases—that is, cases “in the name of the 
State but in reality for the benefit of particular individuals [here the 
bank’s creditors].”157 The Court concluded by stressing that many states 
had similar statutory provisions for liquidating insolvent banks and 
noting that an “enormous burden” would result if it were to exercise 
                                                     
151. Id. at 238. 
152. Id.  
153. Id. at 239. 
154. Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935). 
155. Id. at 340. 
156. Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938). 
157. Id. at 393–94. 
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original jurisdiction over such cases.
158
 
In addition to limiting the Court’s exercise of its original jurisdiction 
over representative suits, the idea of quasi-sovereignty also served as a 
means of protecting state sovereign immunity from suit. The same day 
that the Court decided Tennessee Copper, it also decided a dispute 
between Kansas and Colorado regarding water rights.
159
 Kansas sued 
Colorado to enjoin a diversion of water from the Arkansas River that 
would affect water flow in Kansas.
160
 In concluding that the case was 
justiciable in its original jurisdiction, the Court emphasized that, 
although Kansas was suing on behalf of her citizens, the action did not 
undermine Colorado’s sovereign immunity from suit by private 
citizens.
161
 This was so because the environmental impact of the water 
diversion would affect the “general welfare of the state.”162 Citing 
Tennessee Copper, the Court characterized the case as “involv[ing] a 
matter of state interest.”163 In other words, the state’s quasi-sovereign 
interest in a natural resource ensured that Kansas was not simply suing 
on behalf of private interests in an effort to overcome Colorado’s 
sovereign immunity from suit.
164
 
None of this suggests that the exercise of federal jurisdiction over 
parens patriae suits in the lower federal courts would be constitutionally 
impermissible.
165
 But what it does suggest is that the principle of quasi-
sovereignty began as a principle designed to limit the Court’s original 
                                                     
158. Id. at 396. The Court has continued to follow this approach to parens patriae suits in its 
original jurisdiction. In Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, for example, the Court denied Pennsylvania’s 
motion for leave to file a parens patriae action because its suit “represents nothing more than a 
collectivity of private suits against New Jersey for taxes withheld from private parties.” 426 U.S. 
660, 666 (1976). 
159. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
160. Id. at 47–48. 
161. Id. at 99. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. The Court has extended this reasoning to suits for monetary relief. For example, in a more 
recent case involving the Arkansas River, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar 
Kansas’s original action against Colorado for monetary damages because Kansas was the real party 
in interest and was not simply seeking to recover damages for individual citizens. Kansas v. 
Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 8 (2001); see also Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 132 n.7 (1987) 
(noting that the “enforcement of [an interstate water] Compact was of such general public interest 
that the sovereign State was a proper plaintiff”). 
165. States would, of course, need statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. Because states are not 
“citizens,” they lack the “diversity of citizenship” necessary for federal diversity jurisdiction. 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). Subject-matter jurisdiction would therefore depend on the existence of a 
federal question. Today, this would essentially require that a state suing as parens patriae assert a 
federal statutory or common law cause of action.  
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jurisdiction over public nuisance cases brought by states and to ensure 
private litigants could not overcome state sovereign immunity by suing 
through a nominal state party. The concept of quasi-sovereignty did not 
originally expand states’ standing to litigate questions regarding their 
regulatory authority (i.e., governance interests) under the Constitution. It 
also did not limit a state’s standing in parens patriae actions brought on 
behalf of its citizenry—except in cases brought in the Court’s original 
jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, however, the Court began citing Tennessee Copper 
and other public nuisance cases for the general proposition that a state 
could sue in a representative capacity as long as a “substantial portion” 
of its population was threatened with injury and the state had a quasi-
sovereign interest, described as “an interest apart from that of the 
individuals affected.”166 In 1923, the Court extended the Court’s original 
jurisdiction over representative suits by recognizing state representative 
standing in an interstate commerce case.
167
 Two states sought to enjoin 
enforcement of a West Virginia law restricting the out-of-state flow of 
natural gas produced in West Virginia as a violation of the Commerce 
Clause.
168
 The fact that the constitutional challenge involved a natural 
resource made the case appear analogous to the public nuisance cases 
and amenable to Tennessee Copper’s language regarding a state’s quasi-
sovereign interest in the earth and air.
169
 It was this subtle extension of 
state representative standing beyond interstate nuisance actions to 
constitutional questions of regulatory authority that provided an opening 
for the Court’s much greater expansion in Georgia v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad
170
 in 1945.
171
 
In Pennsylvania Railroad, in a five-four decision, the Court turned the 
concept of quasi-sovereignty on its head by using it to support the 
Court’s original jurisdiction over a parens patriae suit brought by 
Georgia to enjoin a private price-fixing scheme in violation of federal 
antitrust laws.
172
 Georgia alleged that the defendant railroads had 
conspired to fix excessive, discriminatory rates on freight moving into 
and out of Georgia. The Court allowed Georgia to invoke its original 
jurisdiction based on general injury to the state’s economy (which 
                                                     
166. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 583. 
169. See id. at 592 (citing public nuisance cases). 
170. 324 U.S. 439 (1945). 
171. See id. at 449–51 (discussing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923)). 
172. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. at 450. 
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naturally threatens its citizens’ welfare).173 Likening trade barriers and 
discrimination in interstate commerce to the “noxious gas” and the 
“deposit of sewage” found in the public nuisance cases, the Court used 
sweeping language to describe the potential injuries to the “prosperity 
and welfare” of the state.174 Because federal antitrust laws authorized 
states (as “persons”) to sue for injunctive relief, the Court also concluded 
that Georgia had a cause of action.
175
 
This decision disconnected the idea of quasi-sovereignty from its 
association with natural resources and common law causes of action for 
interstate nuisance. After Pennsylvania Railroad, if a state could 
establish a right of action under federal law, it could invoke the Court’s 
original jurisdiction in a parens patriae suit based on a general injury to 
its economy.
176
 Many questions, such as how widespread the injury must 
be, remained unanswered, but one thing was clear: the concept of quasi-
sovereignty no longer meaningfully limited the Court’s original 
jurisdiction. As the next Section demonstrates, once it was divested of its 
original purpose, the concept of quasi-sovereignty was free to serve 
another purpose: it could describe the states’ position in a growing 
federal administrative state. 
2.  Puerto Rico v. Alfred L. Snapp & Son: Quasi-Sovereignty Applied 
to the State-Federal Relationship 
In 1978, Puerto Rico sued Virginia apple growers in federal district 
court, seeking a declaration that the growers had violated federal labor 
and immigration laws as well as an injunction against future violations 
of these laws.
177
 According to the complaint, the apple growers violated 
                                                     
173. See id. at 447 (“The rights which Georgia asserts, parens patriae, are those arising from an 
alleged conspiracy of private persons whose price-fixing scheme, it is said, has injured the economy 
of Georgia.”). 
174. Id. at 451. The Court described the potential injury as “permanent and insidious” and 
described its consequences in dire terms: “Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining 
of a wrong, which if proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shackles her industries, retards 
her development, and relegates her to an inferior economic position among her sister States.” Id. at 
451. 
175. Id. at 462. 
176. Because general injury to a state’s economy is enough for Article III standing, the main 
threshold question in these cases is whether a federal right and remedy exist. Indeed, when Hawaii 
later brought a parens patriae suit for damages under the Clayton Act, the key question was whether 
the federal antitrust statute provided the states with a right of action for monetary damages. Hawaii 
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 259–60 (1972). The Court emphasized that it was not 
questioning whether Hawaii could sue in its capacity as parens patriae, but whether the federal law 
at issue provided the requested remedy. Id. 
177. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 928, 930 (W.D. Va. 
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federal law by failing to employ workers from Puerto Rico before 
employing foreign workers and subjecting Puerto Rican workers to 
unequal working conditions.
178
 Under a federal statute, employers such 
as the apple growers could not employ foreign workers before taking 
certain administrative steps to facilitate the hiring of workers from the 
domestic labor market, which included Puerto Rico.
179
 In addition, an 
employer could not discriminate against domestic workers by treating 
them less favorably than foreign employees.
180
 
Federal statutes then and now establish a national employment service 
under the oversight of federal authorities, primarily the Secretary of 
Labor, but dependent on state cooperation and participation.
181
 In return 
for federal funds, a state (including Puerto Rico) must create an agency 
that supports the objectives of the federal employment service.
182
 In 
Puerto Rico’s suit against the apple growers, the critical objective 
implemented by the relevant state agencies was the maintenance of a 
clearance system whereby employers in one state could communicate 
their employment needs to all other participating states.
183
 According to 
Puerto Rico’s complaint, the relevant agency, the Puerto Rico 
Employment Service, received job orders through this system for 2318 
temporary workers to harvest apples in east coast orchards.
184
 The Puerto 
Rican government recruited 1094 of its nearly three million citizens, but 
only 992 traveled to the mainland after someone at the federal labor 
department reported that Virginia apple growers were refusing to 
employ workers from Puerto Rico.
185
 Only 420 of the 992 workers 
arrived in Virginia, and fewer than thirty remained after only a few 
weeks.
186
 
Responding to the apple growers’ motion to dismiss for lack of 
constitutional standing, the federal district court analyzed whether 
Puerto Rico had standing in its capacity as parens patriae. Noting that 
Puerto Rico’s quasi-sovereign interest was based solely on its general 
economy, the court expressed concern that state standing to sue based on 
                                                     
1979). 
178. Id.  
179. Id. at 929. 
180. Id.  
181. 29 U.S.C. § 49 (2012). 
182. Id. § 49c. 
183. Id. § 49b(a). 
184. Puerto Rico, 469 F. Supp. at 930. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
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such interest “would permit a state to challenge any business or 
governmental decision which would adversely affect[] its economy.”187 
The court then considered various factors, such as the size of the 
population affected, the magnitude of the harm, and the availability of 
private suits for relief.
188
 Given that only a relatively small segment of 
Puerto Rico’s population was affected and private suits were available, 
the district court concluded that Puerto Rico lacked standing.
189
 
After a divided panel on the Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision,190 the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.191 The 
Court treated the suit as one brought by Puerto Rico on behalf of its 
citizens (that is, as a parens patriae suit) and required that Puerto Rico 
demonstrate a quasi-sovereign interest.
192
 In doing so, the Court subtly 
extended the quasi-sovereign requirement once again. The concerns that 
had once motivated the Court to require the state to be more than a 
“nominal” party were not present in this case. Puerto Rico did not 
attempt to bring suit in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Moreover, 
because the defendants were not states, the concern that a state could 
undermine state sovereign immunity by suing in place of individual 
citizens was not present. 
The Court did not mention these concerns,
193
 but instead surveyed the 
precedents in an effort to deduce what quasi-sovereignty might mean. 
After listing and discussing the interstate public nuisance cases, the 
Court stressed that “parens patriae interests extend well beyond the 
prevention of such traditional public nuisances.”194 While the Court 
acknowledged the interstate public nuisance cases, it did not 
acknowledge that the concept of quasi-sovereignty was historically 
connected to a state’s right to protect its natural resources.195 Citing 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the Court also characterized the 
“economic well being” of a state’s citizenry as a quasi-sovereign 
                                                     
187. Id. at 931. 
188. Id. at 932–34. 
189. Id. at 934–35. 
190. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc., 632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980). 
191. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
192. Id. at 601. 
193. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan acknowledged these concerns and noted that 
parens patriae suits in the Court’s original jurisdiction may require a more “restrictive approach.” 
Id. at 611 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
194. Id. at 605. 
195. Id. at 604–05.  
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interest.
196
 In concluding its overview of relevant precedent, the Court 
emphasized that the “public nuisance and economic well-being lines of 
cases were specifically brought together in Georgia v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad.”197 
The Court then used Pennsylvania Railroad to carve out a second 
category of quasi-sovereign interests related to a state’s relationship with 
the federal government: 
[T]he state has an interest in securing observance of the terms 
under which it participates in the federal system. In the context 
of parens patriae actions, this means ensuring that the State and 
its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow 
from participation in the federal system.
198
 
Having created this new category of quasi-sovereign interests, the Court 
held that Puerto Rico could sue on behalf of its citizens to ensure their 
“full and equal participation in the federal employment service 
scheme.”199 According to the Court, Puerto Rico’s interest in securing 
the benefits of federal law for its citizens was “not distinguishable from” 
Georgia’s interest under the federal antitrust laws in Pennsylvania 
Railroad.
200
 Instead of viewing the quasi-sovereign interest in 
Pennsylvania Railroad as a state’s interest in its general economy, the 
Court characterized it as an interest in securing the benefits of federal 
law.
201
 
The Court’s subtle reasoning in Puerto Rico dramatically changed the 
concept of quasi-sovereignty. No longer was it tied to interstate disputes 
regarding natural resources or to the preservation of states’ immunity 
from suit by citizens of other states. In addition to bringing traditional 
parens patriae suits based on the general public welfare, a state could 
now sue to further its citizens’ interests under federal statutes. What 
began as a concept designed to limit federal court jurisdiction over 
interstate disputes was now a concept describing the state’s interest in 
participating in a federal administrative scheme—even when the federal 
statutes at issue do not contemplate state enforcement authority.
202
 In 
                                                     
196. Id. at 605. 
197. Id.  
198. Id. at 608. 
199. Id. at 609. 
200. Id. at 610. 
201. Id. 
202. The Court did not analyze whether Puerto Rico had an implied cause of action to sue under 
the relevant statutes. Given the modern Court’s reluctance to find such causes of action without 
clear evidence of congressional intent, the case would likely be decided differently today. In fact, 
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other words, the Court transformed a concept used to describe a state’s 
sovereignty interests vis-à-vis other states into a concept used to describe 
a state’s sovereignty interests vis-à-vis the federal government. 
This doctrinal shift essentially erased any distinction between a state’s 
sovereign interest and its quasi-sovereign interest. Although the Court 
identified two kinds of “sovereign” interests distinct from a state’s quasi-
sovereign interests, it did not clearly define them.
203
 First, the Court 
identified the state’s sovereign interest in governing its citizens, which 
implicates its “power to create and enforce a legal code” and which “is 
regularly at issue in constitutional litigation,”204 presumably, for 
example, when a state seeking to enforce its laws must respond to a 
defendant’s constitutional challenge. The second “kind” of sovereign 
interest is “the demand for recognition from other sovereigns,” which 
often involves interstate border disputes.
205
 The Court quoted language 
from Pennsylvania Railroad about the framers’ desire to provide states 
with a peaceful forum in which to settle disputes—language it had 
previously used to justify the exercise of its original jurisdiction on the 
basis of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in resolving interstate 
disputes.
206
 
This metamorphosis in doctrine makes sense only when considered in 
tandem with the development of the administrative state in the twentieth 
century.
207
 Pennsylvania Railroad’s expansion of a state’s quasi-
sovereign interest to include its interest in its general economy occurred 
a decade after the New Deal’s expansion of federal authority over 
economic issues in the wake of the Great Depression.
208
 The Supreme 
Court decided Puerto Rico in 1982 after roughly two decades of 
unprecedented congressional expansion of federal administrative 
authority over health, safety and environmental issues—the very issues 
traditionally within the state’s police power. The regulatory landscape 
had changed. States now governed alongside and in cooperation with 
                                                     
contemporaneous decisions suggest that most courts would not have implied a private right of 
action even at that time. See, e.g., Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(per curiam) (holding domestic workers did not have private cause of action under federal law for 
employers’ unlawful hiring of foreign workers, which deprived them of employment). 
203. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. at 601. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1189 (1986). 
208. See id. at 1252 (describing the New Deal’s belief in governmental intervention in the market 
as a dramatic break from a previously “constrained view of national power”). 
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federal administrative agencies. They could not competently exercise 
their police powers—their authority as parens patriae—without 
participating in the modern administrative state. 
This regulatory reality permeates the Puerto Rico decision. 
Significantly, the Court concluded by emphasizing the importance of the 
federal-state relationship contemplated by the underlying statutory 
scheme: “Indeed, the fact that the Commonwealth participates directly in 
the operation of the federal employment scheme makes even more 
compelling its parens patriae interest in assuring that the scheme 
operates to the full benefit of its residents.”209 The Court did not say why 
participation in the federal scheme made Puerto Rico’s interest “more 
compelling,” but Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, joined by three 
other justices, contains a clue. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan also emphasized Puerto 
Rico’s role in implementing the federal law. He described Puerto Rico’s 
interest as a sovereign interest because the alleged violations of federal 
law “directly interfere with Puerto Rico’s ability to perform the job 
referral service that it has undertaken as part of its sovereign 
responsibility to its citizens.”210 Because states could not regulate public 
welfare and the economy without cooperating to some extent with the 
federal government, Justice Brennan’s approach accurately described the 
interest at issue in the case. Puerto Rico’s interest in the lawful operation 
of the federal administrative scheme provided a stronger foundation than 
the doctrine of parens patriae, which was rooted in the absolute 
authority of the king, or the idea of quasi-sovereignty, which was 
designed with interstate relations in mind. Of course, sovereignty 
interests tend to be litigated in suits against other sovereigns, making 
this a less-than-ideal case for such an approach. But Massachusetts v. 
EPA did not present the same problem, and as the following Section 
illustrates, state-standing doctrine would be much more coherent today if 
the Massachusetts Court had adopted Justice Brennan’s approach. 
B.  Massachusetts v. EPA: From Quasi-Sovereignty Back to 
Sovereignty 
In 1999, various private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with 
the EPA, requesting that the agency regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
211
 
                                                     
209. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. at 610. 
210. Id. at 611 n.1. 
211. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007). 
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Four years later, the EPA denied the petition, concluding that it lacked 
authority under the CAA to promulgate regulations addressing global 
climate change and that—even if it did have such authority—it would 
choose not to do so for a number of reasons.
212
 When the petitioners 
appealed the EPA’s denial to the D.C. Circuit, twelve states intervened 
in support of the petitioners.
213
 After the appellate court denied the 
petition for review, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a five-
four opinion, reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the EPA 
has authority under the CAA to regulate GHG emissions from new 
motor vehicles and that it had failed to provide reasons for its denial 
consistent with the statutory text.
214
 
Before reaching the merits, however, the Court had to find that one of 
the petitioners had standing. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens 
concluded that Massachusetts had standing. In reaching this conclusion, 
the fact that Massachusetts is a state appeared to carry particular weight. 
Justice Stevens emphasized the “considerable relevance” of 
Massachusetts’s status as a “sovereign State,” rather than a private 
litigant, and argued that the Court had long treated states differently 
(from other litigants) in analyzing Article III jurisdiction.
215
 Because 
Congress had empowered individuals, including states, to challenge the 
denial of EPA’s rulemaking petition and because Massachusetts sought 
to protect “its quasi-sovereign interests,” Justice Stevens stressed that it 
was “entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”216 
For the proposition that states are not “normal litigants,” Justice 
Stevens cited Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and its language 
regarding quasi-sovereign interests “in all the earth and air within [a 
state’s] domain.”217 Because GHG emissions threatened Massachusetts’s 
coastal land with rising sea levels, it bears some resemblance to the 
interstate public nuisance cases, particularly a case (like Tennessee 
Copper) involving out-of-state emissions that cause in-state air 
pollution. But Justice Stevens did not depend on this analogy to justify 
state standing. Nor could he. Massachusetts was not an interstate public 
nuisance case. The state sought regulatory action on the part of the 
federal government, not a judicial injunction against an out-of-state 
                                                     
212. Id. at 511. 
213. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120). The American Samoa 
Government and three U.S. cities also intervened. Id. 
214. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532, 535. 
215. Id. at 518. 
216. Id. at 520. 
217. Id. at 518–19. 
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nuisance. 
Interstate air pollution today is extensively regulated under the CAA, 
a complex federal statute that contemplates an extensive implementation 
role for state agencies.
218
 States have some latitude to enact more 
stringent standards and to decide how to achieve federal air quality 
standards, but in some areas (for example, vehicle emissions), federal 
law preempts state action.
219
 To ensure the reduction of GHG emissions 
from vehicles, Massachusetts needed the federal government to regulate. 
Given that the intervenor states exercised regulatory authority over 
emissions in a cooperative relationship with the federal government, 
they more closely resembled the position of Puerto Rico in Puerto Rico 
v. Alfred Snapp & Son than Georgia in Tennessee Copper. That is, like 
Puerto Rico’s efforts to secure the benefits of federal employment law, 
they sought to secure the benefits of federal environmental law for their 
citizens. Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens cited Puerto Rico for the 
proposition that a parens patriae suit may be appropriate in cases where 
a state would exercise its police powers but cannot because they are 
preempted by the federal government.
220
 According to the Court, in 
addition to its interest in “all the earth and air within its domain,” 
Massachusetts also had a “quasi-sovereign” interest in enforcement of 
federal law when it preempts state authority.
221
 The quasi-sovereignty 
contemplated by the Court in Massachusetts therefore refers (at least in 
part) to the subordinate status of states to the federal government under 
the Constitution, and it describes how states exercise a different kind of 
sovereignty today given the reach of the modern federal administrative 
state.
222
 
Justice Brennan’s approach in Puerto Rico is therefore apropos. 
Following his approach, we could say that Massachusetts had a 
sovereign interest in enforcing the CAA because the EPA’s inaction 
hindered its ability to carry out its obligations under the CAA—
obligations that the state assumed as part of its “sovereign 
responsibility” to its citizens.223 If we take this approach, we no longer 
                                                     
218. See, e.g., CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (providing for state implementation plans). 
219. See id. § 209(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (preempting state standards absent a federal waiver). 
220. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519. 
221. Id. 
222. Justice Stevens echoed the historical rationale for the Court’s exercise of its original 
jurisdiction, noting that states relinquished sovereign powers of force and diplomacy in interstate 
relations when they entered the federal union. Id. He then added the surrender of state regulatory 
power over in-state vehicle emissions in light of federal preemption. Id.  
223. Cf. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 611 n.1 (1982) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2016  12:49 PM 
676 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:637 
 
need the concept of quasi-sovereignty. In fact, the use of the concept 
only causes confusion and invites dissent. Indeed, writing in dissent in 
Massachusetts, Chief Justice Roberts identified a potential limitation of 
quasi-sovereignty and its association with the parens patriae suit: if a 
state as parens patriae is suing on behalf of its citizens, it must 
necessarily show that its citizens have suffered or will suffer some 
injury.
224
 After all, a state suing in a representative capacity is suing first 
and foremost to vindicate the interests of its citizens. 
In other words, to base state standing on quasi-sovereignty implies 
that a state is seeking access to federal court to vindicate something less 
or other than its own sovereignty, or right to govern. But in cases 
involving cooperative administrative schemes like the one in 
Massachusetts, the state seeks to vindicate its own sovereignty interests 
by challenging federal action (or inaction).
225
 The regulatory regime 
under the CAA includes an implementation role for state governments; 
indeed, the federal government could not implement the administrative 
scheme without state cooperation. When states agree to undertake these 
responsibilities, they do so as sovereign governments seeking to further 
the general welfare of their citizens. 
                                                     
224. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Just as an association suing on 
behalf of its members must show not only that it represents the members but that at least one 
satisfies Article III requirements, so too a State asserting quasi-sovereign interests as parens patriae 
must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III.”). The doctrinal basis for state standing in true 
parens patriae cases is unclear, partly because the Court has failed to distinguish parens patriae 
cases from cases involving governance interests. Some precedent supports Chief Justice Roberts’s 
analogy of state representative standing to associational standing. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State 
Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977) (holding that a state agency representing the state 
apple industry had standing to sue on behalf of the industry). Like the members of the state agency 
in Hunt, a state attorney general who brings a parens patriae suit is elected and paid by the state’s 
citizens. Id. at 344–45. In addition, in many parens patriae cases (e.g., those involving violations of 
consumer protection laws), the state attorney general can allege a “financial nexus” between state 
interests and the collective injuries of its citizens (an indicium of associational standing that 
resembles a quasi-sovereign interest). Id. at 345. Although space constraints prevent further 
treatment of state parens patriae standing in this Article, the topic needs more scholarly and judicial 
development. 
225. Other commentators have interpreted Massachusetts v. EPA to support state standing based 
on the state’s sovereign interests in regulating or governing in certain situations. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1073 (2010) (arguing that “states 
ought to have greater solicitude to pursue . . . challenges [to federal inaction] where the federal 
government has also preempted the states’ freedom to regulate”); Tyler Welti, Note, Massachusetts 
v. EPA’s Regulatory Interest Theory: A Victory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1751, 1779 (2008) (arguing that a “state can vindicate public interests where federal 
inaction (that may amount to an abuse of statutory discretion) impinges on the state’s ability to 
regulate harms that threaten concrete injury such as coastal erosion”). 
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III. LITIGATING GOVERNANCE INTERESTS IN AN ERA OF 
SHARED GOVERNANCE 
Puerto Rico and Massachusetts illustrate the problems in applying old 
doctrines of state standing to litigation of governance interests in the 
modern administrative state. Because states cannot govern in many areas 
without confronting federal administrative law, they should be able to 
challenge federal laws and actions that are part of administrative regimes 
that contemplate an implementation role for the states. As the historical 
discussion in Part I demonstrates, this approach follows easily from 
previous cases involving the litigation of sovereignty interests. States 
have historically litigated sovereignty, or governance, interests, 
though—as Puerto Rico and Massachusetts demonstrate—the modern 
administrative state has changed the kind of governance interests that 
states seek to litigate. While early cases primarily addressed interstate 
conflict, contemporary cases frequently involve state-federal conflict 
arising out of regulatory regimes that contemplate both federal and state 
participation. 
Typically, Congress enlists state assistance in administrative 
government in one of two ways: it either encourages state participation 
by offering federal funds in exchange for state cooperation (as it did in 
the federal employment service at issue in Puerto Rico) or conditions 
non-preemption of state implementation and enforcement authority on a 
state’s agreement to exercise this authority consistent with federal law 
(as it did under the CAA at issue in Massachusetts). This kind of 
“cooperative” federalism, as it is traditionally called, is pervasive. Most 
major antipollution statutes, such as the CAA and the Clean Water Act, 
contemplate substantial state participation, as do other health and safety 
laws. States also agree to implement scores of federal standards in return 
for federal funding in critical areas such as education and health care. 
When states challenge federal actions (or inaction) under these 
administrative schemes, they are playing the role of a sovereign state in 
a post-sovereignty world. That is, they are seeking to vindicate their 
interest in shared governance, the ideal at the heart of cooperative 
federalism. Having agreed to play an administrative role, they have a 
direct interest in shaping the policies and actions of the federal agencies 
charged with ultimate authority under an administrative scheme. Having 
surrendered lawmaking authority, states have a clear interest—as 
separately constituted governments—in the implementation of federal 
law. Moreover, as Seth Davis has argued, given the overlapping nature 
of modern federal-state regulatory authority, “permitting 
intergovernmental litigation over institutional interests may be necessary 
to achieve the competitive checks and balances the Framers envisioned 
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would follow from a world of dual sovereignty.”226 In other words, state 
challenges to federal authority in court “may substitute for the structural 
check of state autonomy that passed away with the death of dual 
sovereignty.”227 
States also have a direct interest in challenging federal power before 
they agree to play the supporting role contemplated by a new federal 
statute. In recent years, the Court has not questioned the standing of 
states to challenge federal laws that seek state cooperation through 
allegedly coercive means. For example, state standing to challenge the 
conditioning of Medicaid funding on Medicaid expansion under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) was not controversial.
228
 But federal courts 
struggled when states sought to challenge the ACA’s individual mandate 
as an impermissible exercise of federal power. Under a governance 
approach to state standing, because the ACA contemplates an 
implementation role for states,
229
 they have a direct interest in resolving 
constitutional questions ex ante—before they invest time and resources 
in complying with the new regime. 
This Part makes the case for a governance approach by anticipating 
potential objections and applying the approach to two recent cases. The 
argument is simple: when states seek to challenge federal laws and 
actions, they have Article III standing if the federal law at issue 
contemplates a role for state governments in its implementation. Federal 
funding conditioned on state assistance in implementing federal law is 
enough, as is conditional preemption of state authority in a given area. 
The implementation role need not be substantial, although states will not 
likely challenge laws that have small impacts (e.g., a law that requires 
very little regulatory change at the state level). The federal law must do 
more than grant states civil and criminal enforcement authority (as some 
consumer protection laws do);
230
 it must contemplate that states will 
share in the day-to-day business of regulating by implementing federal 
policy through state administrative mechanisms and institutions. 
This approach is consistent with the historical litigation of governance 
interests, as described in Part I, while recognizing the dramatically 
different nature of those interests in the modern administrative state. In 
addition to reflecting today’s regulatory reality, the governance approach 
                                                     
226. Davis, supra note 16, at 82–83. 
227. Id. at 83. 
228. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
229. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012). 
230. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1042 
(2012) (authorizing enforcement suits by state attorneys general and state regulators). 
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is a better fit with current doctrine. To demonstrate this, the first part of 
this Section discusses how the approach intersects with the modern 
injury-in-fact approach to individual standing. The governance approach 
to state standing does not replace the injury-in-fact inquiry; rather, it 
simplifies the inquiry by clarifying what a state must show to establish 
an Article III injury in cases challenging federal power. After 
demonstrating how the governance approach can be reconciled with 
current standing doctrine, the second part of this Section explains how 
the governance approach can help illuminate other threshold questions, 
such as whether the court has statutory jurisdiction and whether the state 
plaintiff has a cause of action. The Article concludes with an application 
of the approach to two recent cases: Virginia’s challenge to the ACA and 
Texas’s recent challenge to executive action in the area of immigration. 
A.  Harm to Governance Interests as Article III Injury 
1.  The Three-Part Test for Individual Standing 
In contemporary standing analyses, the Court routinely requires that a 
plaintiff meet three requirements in order to establish Article III 
standing.
231
 First, to show an “injury-in-fact,” a plaintiff must show “an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent.”232 Second, the plaintiff 
must establish a causal connection; the alleged injury must be “fairly 
traceable” to the defendant’s conduct.233 And third, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a favorable court decision is “likely” to redress the 
injury.
234
 Although this three-part test is a fairly recent doctrinal 
development, it is now well established and almost always applied—
even to questions of state standing. 
Of course, in many cases involving state governance interests, the 
Court does not analyze state standing, presumably because the injury to 
state sovereignty is obvious. When, for example, New York challenged a 
federal law that required the state to either take title to hazardous waste 
or pass legislation reflecting federal policies, the Court did not pause to 
consider state standing before deciding the Tenth Amendment 
                                                     
231. The case often cited as support for a definitive three-step test is Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  
232. Id. at 559. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
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challenge.
235
 The injury (infringing on the state’s authority) was obvious. 
It was also “caused” by the federal law and redressable by a Court 
decision invalidating the law. 
Why should cases like Massachusetts v. EPA be any different? If the 
Court had grounded state standing in Massachusetts’s governance 
interests, rather than treating the suit as a parens patriae suit, the 
analysis would have been straightforward: Massachusetts suffered an 
injury to its sovereignty (i.e., to a governance interest) because the EPA 
failed to carry out its rulemaking responsibilities under the CAA. As a 
state with delegated authority under the CAA, it had a “concrete” and 
legally protected interest in the implementation (and therefore the 
prerequisite federal rulemaking) of the Act. Once the injury is clear, the 
other requirements are easily met. The state’s inability to implement 
emissions standards required by the Act was caused by the EPA and 
redressable by a court decision. 
But because the Court essentially treated Massachusetts as a parens 
patriae case, the injuries at issue were injuries to Massachusetts’s 
citizens, specifically, citizens with property affected by rising sea levels. 
To avoid aggregating the injuries of individual citizens,
236
 however, the 
Court focused on the proprietary injury to Massachusetts as a 
landowner.
237
 It then had to grapple with the tenuous causal link between 
coastal erosion of Massachusetts’s land and the EPA’s failure to regulate 
new vehicle GHG emissions and the even more tenuous argument that 
emissions standards would redress Massachusetts’s injury.238 Chief 
Justice Roberts pointedly outlined all these weaknesses in his dissenting 
opinion.
239
 
This confusion is avoidable. If we understand state standing to 
challenge federal administrative action and authority as grounded in a 
state’s interest in governing, the injury is to the state as a sovereign 
government, not the state as property owner or parens patriae. By 
refusing to issue emissions standards, the federal government hindered 
the states’ sovereign responsibility to implement laws that protect the 
public health and welfare. As the Court’s precedents make clear, a 
state’s constitutional sovereignty gives rise to a duty to be responsive 
                                                     
235. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
236. The Court did not say it was avoiding this analysis, but it is a reasonable assumption. Under 
the Court’s parens patriae precedent, it is not clear how many citizens must be injured and whether 
the extent of their injuries matters. 
237. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–23 (2007). 
238. Id. at 523–26. 
239. Id. at 540–46. 
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and accountable to its electorate.
240
 In the contemporary administrative 
state, the idea of sovereignty would mean very little if a state lacked 
standing to challenge federal action (or inaction) under an administrative 
scheme that enlists state cooperation. To be responsive and accountable 
in cooperative administrative governance, states must therefore have a 
mechanism for challenging federal executive action. Review in the 
federal courts is the logical answer. 
These basic principles also support state standing to challenge ex ante 
some federal laws as unconstitutional exercises of federal power. The 
Court has already treated state standing in Tenth Amendment cases like 
New York v. United States as unremarkable.
241
 As discussed in Part I, 
even in Massachusetts v. Mellon—the case often cited for the 
proposition that sovereignty interests are nonjusticiable—the Court 
arguably decided the state’s Tenth Amendment claim on the merits, 
rather than on what courts would understand to be jurisdictional grounds 
today.
242
 In cases involving Congress’s exercise of its Spending Power, 
the line between the traditional Article III injury analysis and the merits 
inquiry is impossible to draw because if a court concludes that a state 
has not alleged an injury-in-fact, it is essentially concluding that the state 
has not made a showing of impermissible coercion by the federal 
government. 
A Ninth Circuit opinion regarding state standing to challenge federal 
funding of legal assistance providers illustrates this overlap in Spending 
Clause cases.
243
 Oregon sued the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), 
alleging that regulatory restrictions on the use of LSC funds violated the 
Tenth Amendment by infringing on the state’s power to regulate law 
practice and legal services programs.
244
 The Ninth Circuit held that 
Oregon lacked standing to sue because “there [was] no burden or injury 
placed on Oregon.”245 Private organizations, the legal service providers, 
were the recipients of the federal funds.
246
 Consequently, “[t]he core of 
the dispute [was] whether Oregon should have the ability to control the 
conditions surrounding a voluntary grant of federal funds to specifically 
                                                     
240. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (“Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than 
compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state 
officials remain accountable to the people.”). 
241. See id. 
242. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923). 
243. Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2009). 
244. Id. at 967. 
245. Id. at 973. 
246. Id. 
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delineated private institutions.”247 The Court concluded that Oregon 
lacked a “right, express or reserved” to control these conditions and 
therefore lacked “a judicially cognizable injury.”248 Like the Court in 
Mellon, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion is essentially one on the merits: 
Oregon failed to state a Tenth Amendment claim of impermissible 
coercion. 
A governance approach to state standing would simplify these cases. 
To determine whether states alleging an injury to their governance 
interests have shown an injury-in-fact, courts would ask whether the 
federal funding scheme contemplates an implementation role for states. 
In the Oregon case, the answer would be no. Although Oregon may not 
pass laws that conflict with federal policy if it wishes legal service 
providers to receive federal funding, this funding does not depend on 
whether the state participates in the implementation of federal policies. 
Given the supremacy of federal law, states must often refrain from 
regulating or regulate in a manner consistent with federal law. This 
tension is not enough for state standing based on a governance interest. 
Moreover, the fact that private organizations, rather than state entities, 
receive the federal funding should not automatically disqualify states 
under Article III. The critical inquiry is whether the federal law 
encourages states to aid in its implementation. If it does, states should 
have standing to litigate whether Congress exceeded its constitutional 
authority. 
The requirement that a state show that the federal law underlying its 
challenge contemplates a governance role for states ensures that a true 
Article III case or controversy is before the federal court. When a federal 
law provides mechanisms for state cooperation, both the federal and 
state governments have an “actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the 
outcome,” which ensures that judicial decisions are based on concrete 
interests litigated by adversaries.
249
 Indeed, as Massachusetts v. EPA 
illustrates, state-federal conflicts under cooperative regulatory regimes 
raise concrete, particular questions about the concurrent and overlapping 
authority of state and federal governments. The fact that the framers 
                                                     
247. Id. at 974. 
248. Id. 
249. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Language regarding concrete interests and 
adversarial posture harkens back to the canonical case of Baker v. Carr, requiring that parties show 
a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions.” 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
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could not have anticipated the federalism of today cannot mean that the 
intergovernmental conflicts generated by today’s federalism are not 
Article III cases or controversies. 
2.  The Bar on Litigating the Generalized Interest in the Proper 
Administration of Laws 
In contemporary standing cases, the Court has grappled with the 
extent to which Article III permits individual suits based on generalized 
grievances, that is, grievances widely shared by the general public. At 
times, the Court has treated this as a prudential, rather than a 
constitutional, limitation on Article III standing, suggesting it need not 
bar the suit.
250
 In recent cases, the Court has made clear that, as long as 
an individual meets the injury-in-fact requirement, constitutional 
standing should not be limited by the fact that many others share the 
plaintiff’s injury.251 Indeed, the injuries caused by climate change (and 
other environmental harms) are almost always widely shared, but the 
Court has accepted that they fall within Article III’s case or controversy 
requirement.
252
 
The Court has continued, however, to reject one kind of suit based on 
a generalized grievance: a suit by a private individual based on the 
generalized grievance in the executive’s administration of the laws.253 In 
fact, in a recent decision, the Court emphasized that Article III does not 
permit “suits ‘claiming only harm to [the plaintiff’s] and every citizen’s 
interest in proper administration of the Constitution and laws, and 
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it 
does the public at large.’”254 Historically, individuals sought to challenge 
federal laws and actions on the basis of their standing as taxpayers; they 
alleged injury to their interest in proper application of laws and 
expenditures of public funds.
255
 The Court routinely dismissed such 
suits, concerned that they would render Article III’s case or controversy 
                                                     
250. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982) (treating “generalized grievances” as a prudential consideration). 
251. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (explaining that a generalized, or widely shared, 
harm may satisfy Article III’s injury requirement if it is concrete rather than abstract and noting, as 
examples, mass torts and voting rights injuries). 
252. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (discussing harms resulting from 
climate change).  
253. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574 (1992). 
254. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 
n.3 (2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74). 
255. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 574–76 (discussing cases). 
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requirement meaningless and threaten the constitutional separation of 
powers among the three branches.
256
 
The Court has elaborated on the separation-of-powers concern in 
cases brought by states and individuals under “citizen-suit” 
provisions.
257
 In these types of cases, Congress has explicitly authorized 
suits by private individuals for particular violations of federal law.
258
 
Many major environmental laws have such provisions, which are 
designed to further their enforcement (often by nongovernmental 
organizations suing on behalf of their members).
259
 And the 
Administrative Procedure Act also authorizes individual suits to 
challenge final federal agency actions when specific statutes do not 
cover such actions.
260
 But as Justice Scalia has emphasized, Congress 
cannot constitutionally confer on private individuals an individual right 
to sue to enforce public rights:  
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public 
interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an 
‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress 
to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s 
most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.’261  
In short, statutory authorization to sue is not enough without individual 
                                                     
256. Id. 
257. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–
77. Justice Scalia, in particular, has understood Article III standing in terms of separation of powers. 
See, e.g., Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695 
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Article III standing is grounded in the separation of 
powers). Historical accounts of the injury requirement suggest that it is grounded in Justice 
Frankfurter’s attempt to limit judicial review of New Deal legislation, rather than in constitutional 
history and precedent. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A 
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 462 (1996) (arguing that Justice Frankfurter’s 
limits on the judicial power—to traditional private suits for common law injuries—ignored 
historical English practice and founding-era understandings). 
258. See cases cited supra note 257; Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
459 (2008) (examining how standing doctrine purports to serve various separation-of-powers 
“functions” and arguing that the Court’s modern standing doctrine does not further these functions). 
259. See, e.g., CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012) (providing a right of action to sue 
governmental actors and private individuals for violations of act); Clean Water Act (CWA) 
§ 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012) (providing a right of action to sue private and governmental 
actors for violations of the act). As is frequently the case, these provisions also authorize suits by 
states by defining the “person” or “citizen” who may sue to include governmental entities. See CAA 
§ 302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (defining “person”); CWA § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (defining 
“citizen”). 
260. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012). 
261. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
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injury.
262
 
But this limitation on citizen suits to vindicate public interests makes 
little sense applied to the states. As Richard Fallon has recently argued, 
the “Court should make explicit that in some contexts, the standing 
requirements that apply to private parties do not extend to the 
government and its officials, and that in other cases the same formally 
articulated demands require adjustments in light of the government’s 
special status and role.”263 Unlike individuals, states are obligated to 
represent their electorates’ interests. When they challenge federal action 
or law that contemplates a governance role for states, they are not suing 
based on a generalized grievance, but are instead seeking to vindicate 
their concrete interests in governing—either as separate regulatory 
entities or as cooperative agencies under a federal administrative 
scheme. If the administrative scheme contemplates a governance role for 
states in its implementation, states as regulatory participants in the 
scheme have an interest that individual litigants do not share. 
Moreover, assuming that federal law provides a cause of action, state 
suits seeking to resolve questions of executive power do not present the 
same separation-of-powers problems.
264
 This is so even if a state suit 
challenging federal executive action is somewhat analogous to suits 
between federal agencies or officials. Though examples of such cases in 
the Supreme Court are rare,
265
 the Court has not explicitly said that they 
violate the constitutional separation of powers.
266
 In fact, the Court has 
                                                     
262. As Aziz Huq has argued, the Court’s current practice of allowing individuals to sue to 
vindicate structural constitutional rights, such as federalism, is in tension with the notion that 
individuals may not enforce public rights. Huq, supra note 116, at 1473. States, he argues, are the 
parties that benefit directly and primarily from constitutional principles of federalism. Id. 
263. Fallon, supra note 8, at 1109; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“As 
Government programs and policies become more complex and farreaching, we must be sensitive to 
the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law 
tradition.”). 
264. While still a circuit judge, Justice Scalia noted that state parens-patriae suits challenging 
federal actions do not necessarily raise separation of powers concerns provided Congress has 
authorized states to sue. See Md. People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
265. See, e.g., United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974); see also Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47 GA. L. REV. 1217, 
1238–42 (2013) (detailing history of intergovernmental litigation in the Supreme Court). 
266. See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue 
Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 915 (1991) (arguing that under the model of the “unitary 
executive,” judicial resolution of interagency disputes would violate the separation of powers, but 
that the unitary executive model is empirically and theoretically false). In a recent case, however, 
Justice Scalia unequivocally expressed the view that intergovernmental litigation of political 
authority falls outside Article III. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, __ U.S. 
__, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2694 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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indicated that Congress may authorize intergovernmental litigation 
based on conflicting regulatory interests without violating Article III.
267
 
Although the Court has emphasized that it would be “inappropriate” for 
it to routinely decide “intrabranch and intraagency policy disputes,” it 
has acknowledged that Congress could in some circumstances authorize 
intragovernmental litigation consistent with Article III.
268
 If it does not 
violate Article III to authorize litigation within the executive branch, it 
surely does not violate Article III to authorize litigation between the 
states and the federal government—even if the states are cooperating 
with the executive in implementing federal law.
269
 
In the end, the notion that states should be able to litigate “public” 
interests, though private parties may not, should be unremarkable. 
Although the Court’s “special solicitude” for states in Massachusetts v. 
EPA may appear exceptional, the history of state standing demonstrates 
that they often are treated differently and for good reasons.
270
 Like the 
federal government, state governments have interests different from 
private litigants. Inherent in any concept of modern sovereignty is the 
obligation to further the generalized interest in the proper administration 
of the law. Indeed, a government’s historical standing to enforce its own 
criminal and civil laws in its own courts is premised on this very idea.
271
 
Moreover, the federal government’s standing to challenge state laws on 
preemption grounds is apparently unremarkable. In 2012, the Court 
decided whether federal law preempted a set of new immigration laws in 
Arizona and did so without commenting on the federal government’s 
                                                     
267. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 
514 U.S. 122, 133 (1995). 
268. Id. at 129, 133. 
269. This is true, of course, only if Congress and the President can constitutionally delegate 
authority to implement and enforce federal laws to state governments. Cooperative administrative 
schemes provide for federal oversight and are likely constitutional. Outright delegation of 
enforcement authority may, however, raise issues.  
270. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986) (noting that, unlike a private party, a 
“[s]tate clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”); 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (holding that private citizen lacked standing to defend 
constitutionality of state statute because “only the State has . . . [a] ‘direct stake’ . . . in defending 
the standards embodied in [its legal] code”); see also Davis, supra note 16, at 61–62 (arguing that 
state agencies implementing federal administrative schemes have special expertise and interests that 
support implied rights of action to enforce federal law when private litigants may not have similar 
rights of action); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 73 (2011) (noting that “it makes sense to conclude that special protections for the states must 
develop in the administrative realm if federalism is to have continuing relevance in the world of 
national administrative governance that increasingly dominates today”). 
271. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 
299–300 (2005); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 422.  
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Article III standing.
272
 If the federal government has standing based on 
its interest in the proper administration of laws, the states should as well. 
B.  Finding the Appropriate Box: Separating State Standing from 
Other Threshold Questions 
In addition to bringing coherence to the doctrine of state standing to 
challenge federal law, the governance approach would ensure that other 
threshold questions are resolved separately. Questions regarding whether 
a federal court has statutory subject matter jurisdiction and whether a 
state has a cause of action under federal law are often difficult to resolve. 
A complicated standing analysis that treats states like private parties 
increases the likelihood that a court will overlook these important 
questions or subsume them within the standing analysis. These 
distinctions are important because, unlike questions of Article III 
standing, questions regarding statutory jurisdiction and federal causes of 
action require courts to give effect to Congress’s intent. In other words, 
these are questions ideally resolved via the political process, whereas 
questions regarding standing are questions of constitutional 
interpretation ideally resolved by courts. Article III standing is the 
constitutional minimum, but Congress may generally expand or contract 
states’ access to the courts by passing appropriate legislation. Although a 
thorough examination of these doctrinal areas is beyond the scope of this 
Article, the following discussion provides a basic overview of how they 
differ from the standing analysis and raises questions for further 
scholarly inquiry. 
1.  Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
A state that has Article III standing to sue the federal government 
based on a governance interest will also have to assert a statutory basis 
for the federal court’s jurisdiction. Because states are not citizens for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, if they are not seeking to invoke the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, they must bring suit in a federal 
district court or appellate court pursuant to a congressional grant of 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Often the basis for such jurisdiction 
                                                     
272. Arizona v. United States, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112, 117 n.1 (1970) (noting that both states and the federal government sought to invoke 
the Court’s original jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of conflicting state and federal laws 
governing voting rights); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958) 
(holding that declaratory judgment action brought by the federal government against a state entity 
was justiciable under Article III). 
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will be in the district courts pursuant to their general federal question 
jurisdiction.
273
 Congress is free, of course, to expand or limit this 
jurisdiction in specific statutes. Some federal administrative schemes 
contain their own jurisdictional provisions. States must, for example, 
seek review of EPA actions that have a “nationwide scope or effect” 
under the Clean Air Act only in the D.C. Circuit.
274
 
When a state relies on the general grant of federal jurisdiction in 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, jurisdiction will depend on whether the case “arises 
under” the Constitution or other federal law (namely statutes and federal 
common law).
275
 Although § 1331’s language closely tracks the 
jurisdictional language in Article III,
276
 the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the statutory grant differently and much more narrowly than 
the constitutional grant.
277
 While the Constitution may permit federal 
jurisdiction over cases that simply present federal issues, cases generally 
“arise under” § 1331 only when federal law provides a cause of action 
that appears on the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.278 In challenges to 
administrative action, such as the one in Massachusetts v. EPA, states 
typically bring suit under a statutory provision authorizing individual 
state and citizen suits.
279
 In these cases, whether federal law clearly 
provides a cause of action is a question of statutory interpretation. 
But when states seek a declaration that federal law is unconstitutional 
(and that state law or authority is therefore not preempted), they may 
face an additional jurisdictional obstacle. Although federal statutory law 
provides a remedy (the declaratory judgment), the Court has interpreted 
the relevant statute to provide only a remedy.
280
 That is, it does not 
                                                     
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7607(b)(1) (2012). 
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 
276.  Compare id., with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in 
law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States . . . .”). 
277. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.1 (6th ed. 2012) 
(providing an overview of the differences in Supreme Court interpretations of constitutional and 
statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction). 
278. This generalization regarding federal question jurisdiction oversimplifies what is a 
complicated and not entirely coherent doctrinal area of law. But because many of the complications 
arise when a plaintiff files a state law cause of action, they are not relevant to state suits challenging 
federal authority, which are clearly grounded in federal law. For a more detailed overview, see id. 
§ 5.2. 
279. See cases cited supra note 259. 
280. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (“Congress [in the 
Declaratory Judgment Act] enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not 
extend their jurisdiction.”). 
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confer statutory jurisdiction on a federal court; a party seeking a 
declaratory judgment must establish a separate basis for jurisdiction. 
When the basis for jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a court must decide 
whether federal law creates the cause of action, raising the difficult 
question of whether a state has a federal “right” to sue to invalidate 
federal laws under the Constitution.
281
 
The language of the Declaratory Judgment Act arguably ties the 
existence of a federal right to sue to the existence of an Article III “case 
or controversy.” With some exceptions, the Federal Act authorizes 
federal courts to grant declaratory relief “[i]n a case of actual 
controversy within its jurisdiction,” even when other relief is 
available.
282
 Courts have therefore analyzed the appropriateness of 
declaratory relief in constitutional litigation in Article III terms and 
exercised caution when issues appear hypothetical or abstract.
283
 But 
despite the cautionary language in some cases, the federal courts have 
exercised jurisdiction over a number of suits seeking declarations 
regarding the validity of state and federal laws.
284
 Moreover, the federal 
courts have exercised jurisdiction over state-federal litigation involving 
the constitutional distribution of governmental power.
285
 As discussed 
above, states have sought declaratory judgments that federal law is 
impermissibly coercive in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
286
 
Nevertheless, some Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Court 
may interpret § 1331 narrowly in a state suit seeking only a declaration 
that a federal law regulating individuals does not preempt state law.
287
 In 
                                                     
281. See id. at 671–72. 
282. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
283. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (describing a “justiciable 
controversy” under the Declaratory Judgment Act as “definite and concrete,” as opposed to 
“hypothetical or abstract”). 
284. See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2763 
(3d ed. 2015) (summarizing and citing federal suits for declaratory judgments involving public law). 
285. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 752 (1982) (state suit to declare certain federal 
laws unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment). 
286. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (state suit to declare certain 
federal laws unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause). When the 
United States is a plaintiff, statutory subject-matter jurisdiction is arguably aided by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1345, which provides that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, 
suits or proceedings commenced by the United States.” 
287. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983); 
see also Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 55, 65 (2012) 
(arguing that a federal court does not have statutory subject-matter jurisdiction when a state sues to 
declare federal law unconstitutional unless either party could have brought a nondeclaratory action 
against the other party). 
10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2016  12:49 PM 
690 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:637 
 
1983, in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust,
288
 the Court suggested that federal courts should decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over such a suit unless Congress specifically 
authorizes it.
289
 In doing so, it noted that states do not suffer prejudice 
because preemption issues may be litigated when individuals subject to 
federal law sue for injunctive relief, and states may enforce their laws in 
their own courts where they may also raise preemption questions.
290
 
Franchise Tax Board is distinguishable in important respects from 
state challenges to federal power based on governance interests. First, it 
was originally brought by a state entity in state court pursuant to state 
law.
291
 The question of federal jurisdiction was prompted only by the 
defendant’s removal of the case to federal court on the basis of a federal 
preemption defense.
292
 The Court’s reasoning and holding were 
therefore informed by principles of comity.
293
 Second, with the 
expansion of the federal administrative state, the need for uniform, ex 
ante resolution of state-federal conflicts has arguably grown, making the 
piecemeal resolution of these issues in injunctive suits by individuals 
less desirable.
294
 However these jurisdictional questions are resolved, the 
critical point is that they need resolution, but are too often obscured by 
convoluted and unnecessary analyses of Article III standing. The 
governance approach to state standing would help concentrate judicial 
analysis where it is needed most. 
2.  Federal Causes of Action 
Although the Court often says that whether a federal cause of action 
exists is not a question of jurisdiction, the two questions often overlap, 
as the discussion above makes clear. Moreover, particularly in 
administrative law, certain issues can be jurisdictional in some cases but 
                                                     
288. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
289. Id. at 21–22. 
290. Id. at 21. 
291. Id. at 5–6. 
292. Id. at 6. 
293. See id. at 21 n.22 (“[I]t is perhaps appropriate to note that considerations of comity make us 
reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State, unless some clear 
rule demands it.”). A plaintiff’s request for a declaration that federal law does not preempt state law 
clearly appears to arise under federal law. Courts struggle, however, because preemption claims are 
traditionally raised as defenses, rather than as part of the original complaint. See Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (noting that “[f]ederal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal 
defense to the plaintiff’s suit”). 
294. The import of this case is also unclear in light of subsequent cases. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
481 U.S. at 64 (treating Franchise Tax Board as a case about removal jurisdiction). 
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not in others. For example, if a state seeks review under a specific 
statutory authorization to sue, like the one in the Clean Air Act, the 
relevant statutory provision may contain jurisdictional elements.
295
 
When, however, a state seeks review of an agency action under the 
general review provisions in the Administrative Procedure Act, subject-
matter jurisdiction must be grounded elsewhere (typically in § 1331’s 
general grant of federal question jurisdiction).
296
 But even when the 
questions overlap, courts should take care to analyze them separately. As 
the above discussion of the Declaratory Judgment Act demonstrates, the 
availability of a federal remedy does not necessarily mean a federal 
court has jurisdiction.
297
 Similarly, when a federal court has jurisdiction 
over an arguable cause of action “arising under” federal law, it may 
nevertheless dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim. 
When a state seeks to challenge federal law or action, it must allege a 
valid cause of action under federal law. State suits against the federal 
government based on governance interests generally take one of two 
forms: a suit seeking to invalidate federal law as a violation of the 
Constitution (e.g., as outside Congress’s enumerated powers or in 
contravention of the Tenth Amendment) or a suit challenging federal 
agency action (or inaction) pursuant to a statutory provision specifically 
authorizing individual suits for violations of federal law. 
In the first kind of case (state actions challenging federal authority 
under the Constitution), a court must ask whether the right of action 
arises under the Constitution or elsewhere. Recently, in Armstrong v. 
Exceptional Child Center Inc.,
298
 the Court considered whether an 
implied right of action exists under the Supremacy Clause.
299
 In deciding 
that such a right does not exist, the Supreme Court made clear that 
plaintiffs could nevertheless seek to enjoin unconstitutional 
governmental action because the “ability to enjoin unconstitutional 
actions by state and federal officers” is an inherent power of federal 
courts of equity.
300
 The Court was unanimous on this point; the four 
                                                     
295. See, e.g., Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 686 F.3d 803, 808 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (treating lack of final agency decision as jurisdictional under CAA’s judicial review 
provision). 
296. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977) (holding that the APA’s review provisions 
do not grant subject-matter jurisdiction). 
297. See supra Section III.B.1. 
298. __U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). 
299. Id. 
300. Id. at 1384; see also Preis, supra note 82 (arguing that federal courts have historical power 
in constitutional cases to imply injunctive relief); John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1022 (2008) (arguing that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), involved a traditional 
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dissenting justices agreed that the power of “federal courts to enjoin 
unconstitutional government action is not subject to serious dispute.”301 
The Court’s decision in Armstrong suggests that a state seeking to enjoin 
the enforcement of federal law need not identify a separate right under 
the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal common law. Congress may, 
of course, foreclose suits for injunctive relief for specific violations of 
federal law.
302
 
Whether Armstrong suggests that a cause of action for declaratory 
relief is similarly within the federal courts’ equitable authority is not 
clear. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the 
Court “has thus long entertained suits in which a party seeks prospective 
equitable protection from an injurious and preempted state law without 
regard to whether the federal statute at issue itself provided a right to 
bring an action.”303 In support of this proposition, she cited cases in 
which plaintiffs sought declaratory relief.
304
 The precise origins and 
nature of declaratory relief are somewhat contested, however.
305
 Given 
that state suits to invalidate federal law under the Constitution involve 
issues of governmental power likely to be litigated as injunctive suits in 
equity, federal precedents arguably suggest that declaratory relief is 
within a federal court’s equitable power and that, under the reasoning of 
Armstrong, it is a remedy that does not require an implied constitutional 
right of action.
306
 
                                                     
equitable remedy, the anti-suit injunction, and that this type of action arguably allows suits to 
enforce constitutional provisions which do not alone create causes of action). 
301. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1390 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
302. See, e.g., id. at 1385 (majority opinion) (holding that Medicaid statute precludes private 
enforcement).  
303. Id. at 1391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
304. Id. (citing, for example, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), in which plaintiff 
sought declaration that state law was preempted by federal law). 
305. Recognizing that the federal remedy is statutory, but also within the discretion of the court, 
federal courts have often looked to the nature of the underlying issues in a case to determine 
whether they would have presented actions in law or equity in the absence of a declaratory remedy. 
See, e.g., Wallace v. Norman Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1972) (“A declaratory 
judgment action cannot be termed as either inherently at law or in equity. When classification has 
been required, courts have examined the basic nature of the issues involved to determine how they 
would have arisen had Congress not enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act.”). In addition, the 
Supreme Court has characterized a court’s resolution of such matters as “equitable in nature.” 
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952). 
306. As John Harrison has noted, traditional suits to enjoin future legal proceedings (in which a 
plaintiff asserts a defense she would otherwise have in a legal action) resemble declaratory 
judgment actions: “both are used by potential defendants to become plaintiffs and assert defenses 
without waiting to be sued.” Harrison, supra note 300, at 1000. This, he argues, is not a historical 
accident; the law professor who advocated forcefully for the adoption of declaratory judgment 
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In the second kind of state challenge, when a state sues under a 
federal statute, questions analyzed as part of the Article III standing 
inquiry may be more appropriately characterized as questions regarding 
whether the plaintiff has a right of action under federal law. For 
example, in Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc.,
307
 the Supreme Court cautioned that a question often characterized 
as part of the “prudential standing” analysis under Article III is more 
appropriately analyzed as a matter of statutory interpretation.
308
 Courts 
had analyzed, as a matter of prudential standing, whether a plaintiff who 
sues under a federal statute falls within the “zone of interests” protected 
by the statute.
309
 The Lexmark Court emphasized that the correct inquiry 
is not one of standing, but “whether a legislatively conferred cause of 
action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim”—a question that 
requires judicial interpretation of the statute.
310
 
Lexmark recognizes that statutory challenges sometimes involve 
questions of statutory interpretation that are more appropriately resolved 
as such rather than incorporated into the Article III standing analysis. 
This may be particularly true in the kinds of cases brought by states 
challenging federal administrative action or inaction as unlawful 
exercises of authority. These cases are typically brought under statutory 
provisions conferring procedural rights, such as the right to challenge a 
final agency action regarding a rulemaking or petition for a rulemaking. 
In these cases, plaintiffs must assert a procedural right of action under 
the statute. Rather than analyzing whether the plaintiff has a procedural 
right as a question of Article III injury, courts should analyze this as a 
question of statutory interpretation. Under a governance approach to 
state standing, this distinction would be clear. If a state challenges 
federal action under an administrative statute that contemplates state 
implementation, it will have standing to bring the suit. But this does not 
mean that the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction or that the 
state has a cause of action. 
To illustrate the distinction, consider current state litigation to 
invalidate court-sanctioned settlement agreements between the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) and conservation groups. Midwestern states 
are essentially asking a federal court to invalidate agreements in which 
                                                     
statutes “regarded them as an improved form of the suit to restrain legal proceedings.” Id.  
307. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
308. Id. at 1386. 
309. Id.  
310. Id. at 1387. 
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the FWS agreed to specific timelines for deciding whether to list various 
candidate species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
311
 The 
states argue that these agreements prevent the FWS from maintaining a 
species’ classification as “warranted but precluded” by resource 
limitations—a classification the agency may make in its discretion.312 
They also note that they were not part of the settlement negotiations or 
otherwise consulted and were thereby “deprived of an opportunity to 
participate in shaping the substantive policy choices embedded in the 
FWS’s settlements.”313 
The ESA contemplates a shared governance role for states.
314
 In 
shutting states out of the policymaking decisions adopted in the 
settlements, states have arguably suffered an injury to their governance 
interests and should therefore be able to establish Article III standing.
315
 
The problem, however, is that states lack a cause of action. The states 
essentially claim that the settlements violate the ESA because they 
prevent the FWS from making a warranted-but-precluded finding for 
species covered by the settlements.
316
 But as the D.C. Circuit has 
recognized, the ESA does not require a warranted-but-precluded finding 
and Congress did not provide plaintiffs with “a means to require 
continued warranted-but-precluded findings.”317 The only right of action 
under the ESA is an action challenging the agency’s final rule listing the 
species.
318
 In short, the state plaintiffs do not have a cause of action. 
Although courts sometimes couch this analysis in standing doctrine, it is 
fundamentally a question of whether the statute provides a cause of 
                                                     
311. See Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma v. Dep’t of 
Interior, No. 1:15-cv-00252-EGS (D.D.C. July 31, 2015). 
312. Id. at 2. 
313. Id. at 1. 
314. ESA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)–(d) (2012) (authorizing FWS to enter into cooperative 
agreements with states that have “adequate and active [conservation] programs” and to provide 
federal funding in conjunction with cooperative agreements). 
315. Recently, the D.C. Circuit denied a petition for review of EPA’s proposed rules regulating 
GHG emissions from power plants. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
Both private and state plaintiffs brought the suit. Id. at 334. The court correctly denied the petition 
because EPA’s rules are not yet final. Id. at 333–34. But it also noted that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to challenge the settlement agreement establishing a timeline for regulation because they 
were not injured by a procedural deadline. Id. at 336. Although the state plaintiffs clearly lack a 
statutory right of action to challenge the settlements, their status as states should provide standing to 
sue based on their shared governance role under the Clean Air Act.  
316. Id.  
317. In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litigation—MDL No. 2165, 704 F.3d 972, 
978 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
318. Id. at 977. 
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action. 
C.  Applying the Governance Approach: Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius and Texas v. United States 
In the contemporary administrative state, intergovernmental conflict 
over regulatory authority is likely to increase. Although most state-
federal regulatory partnerships do not require judicial resolution, the 
large number of these partnerships ensures that some conflicts regarding 
regulatory power will require adjudication. Application of an incoherent 
and flawed doctrine of state standing only threatens to prolong conflict 
and increase the costs of governing. The governance approach to state 
standing serves a gatekeeping function; it grants Article III standing to 
states with direct, concrete injuries to governance interests and denies it 
to states alleging indirect, insubstantial injuries to other kinds of 
interests. 
Two recent controversies between states and the federal government 
illustrate this dynamic and are the subject of this Section. In the first 
case, a challenge by Virginia to the individual mandate under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), the governance approach would confer 
standing on the state plaintiff, though other threshold questions might 
prevent the lawsuit.
319
 In the second case, a very recent challenge by 
Texas and other states to a federal immigration policy, the governance 
approach would not confer standing on the states.
320
 In both cases, the 
governance approach reaches a result different from the federal court’s 
resolution and does so through a much more streamlined, coherent 
analytical framework than the federal courts currently use. 
1.  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius 
After the ACA passed in 2010, Virginia passed a state law declaring, 
among other things, that “[n]o resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall 
be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance 
coverage.”321 The state statute was a clear repudiation of the ACA’s 
“individual mandate,” a provision requiring most individuals to purchase 
health insurance coverage or pay a penalty.
322
 Virginia also sued the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, challenging 
                                                     
319. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
320. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015). 
321. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 267 (quoting VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-3434.1:1 (2011)).  
322. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2012). 
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the individual-mandate provision as an unconstitutional exercise of 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.323 Virginia prevailed 
in the lower federal court, but the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia 
lacked Article III standing to sue.
324
 
Virginia argued that it had standing based on injury to its sovereign 
interest in creating and enforcing a legal code.
325
 Indeed, both parties 
(and the courts) assumed that the state’s statutory declaration regarding 
individual insurance coverage was central to the standing inquiry. 
Virginia argued that its sovereign interest in passing laws gave it 
standing to litigate the constitutionality of a federal law preempting state 
law.
326
 The federal government argued that Virginia’s statute was merely 
a declaratory attempt to nullify federal law and that its lawsuit was, in 
reality, a parens patriae suit brought on behalf of its citizens seeking to 
shield those citizens from the operation of federal law.
327
 The Supreme 
Court has on more than one occasion rejected such a suit.
328
 
Focusing on the state statute, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 
“non-binding declaration does not create any genuine conflict with the 
individual mandate, and thus creates no sovereign interest capable of 
producing injury-in-fact.”329 Given that the Act was essentially 
unenforceable, the court characterized Virginia’s “real interest” as an 
interest in litigating a policy preference (against the individual mandate) 
on behalf of individuals.
330
 This, of course, it could not do. The court 
noted that a contrary ruling would permit a state to “acquire standing to 
challenge any federal law merely by enacting a statute,” a result that 
would allow “each state . . . [to] become a roving constitutional 
watchdog of sorts.”331 Particularly because the challenged provision 
applied only to individuals, the court did not think that the state-federal 
conflict generated by Virginia’s declaratory statute was sufficient to 
“assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 
                                                     
323. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 266. 
324. Id. at 267. 
325. Appellee’s Opening and Response Brief at 19–20, Virginia, 656 F.3d 253 (Nos. 11-1057, 
11-1058). 
326. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 268; see also Kenneth T. Cuccinelli et al., State Sovereign Standing: 
Often Overlooked, But Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89 (2012) (detailing Virginia’s arguments 
for state standing based on sovereignty interests). 
327. Brief for Appellant at 24–28, Virginia, 656 F.3d 253 (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058). 
328. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 485–86 (1923). 
329. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 270. 
330. Id. at 271. 
331. Id. at 272. 
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issues.”332 
The court’s standing analysis is a reasonable application of the injury-
in-fact requirement to a state statute. Surely state statutes purporting to 
nullify federal law cannot open the federal courthouse doors to state 
suits. But if Virginia had focused less on its declaratory statute and more 
on the nature of the ACA and the governance role it contemplates for 
states, perhaps the outcome would have been different. At the very least, 
a governance approach to the issue would address the court’s concern 
with opening the floodgates to state litigation of federal statutes. States 
would have standing only in cases involving a federal administrative 
scheme that contemplates an implementation role for states.
333
 
The ACA contemplates a substantial role for states in its 
implementation.
334
 Even if states may choose not to play any 
implementation role (as five states have), Congress drafted the 
regulatory scheme counting on the fact that at least some states will 
cooperate with the federal government.
335
 And that is precisely what has 
happened. Although many states have chosen to use the federally 
facilitated marketplace, a significant subset of these states are running 
various aspects of their marketplaces or continuing to conduct plan 
management (review of plans for compliance with marketplace 
standards).
336
 Well over half of all states have passed legislative or 
regulatory measures designed to implement ACA market reforms.
337
 
Indeed, because the field of private health insurance has historically 
                                                     
332. Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
333. State standing in cases like Virginia resembles third-party standing in that states have 
standing based on an alleged injury to a governance interest, but are challenging the federal 
government’s power to regulate individuals, who are not parties. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976) (allowing bartender to challenge a state law permitting the sale of 3.2% beer to women at 
age eighteen, but barring sale to men until age twenty-one).  
334. See Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How States Can 
Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275 (2013) (arguing that 
ACA gives states broad regulatory flexibility and may even lead to expanded state authority over 
private health insurance). 
335. See Gluck, supra note 7, at 578 (noting that the states’ “leadership role” was critical to the 
ACA’s passage). 
336. KATIE KEITH & KEVIN W. LUCIA, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 10 (2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/ 
Fund%20Report/2014/Jan/1727_Keith_implementing_ACA_state_of_states.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4SCT-XUVM]; see also, The Affordable Care Act’s Health Insurance 
Marketplaces by Type, COMMONWEALTH FUND, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/interactives-
and-data/maps-and-data/state-exchange-map [https://perma.cc/9BJT-MUEW] (last visited May 28, 
2016) (showing thirteen states with state marketplaces and nineteen states with varying levels of 
state-federal cooperation in 2015). 
337. KEITH & LUCIA, supra note 336, at 14. 
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been regulated by states,
338
 the ACA disrupts a great many state laws 
and regulatory practices and replaces them with a state-federal, shared-
governance model. 
It is difficult to imagine a litigant with a more concrete interest in 
litigating the constitutionality of the ACA than a state government 
considering its regulatory options. Before investing resources in 
regulatory reform, a state has a concrete interest in litigating the 
boundaries of state-federal power. If the federal statute seeks to enlist 
state cooperation in governance, the state has a direct interest in 
resolving the constitutionality of the federal scheme before deciding 
whether to cooperate. Should the federal scheme be struck down as 
unconstitutional after a state agrees to cooperate, the state will incur 
costs, including lost opportunity costs (that is, costs associated with the 
time and resources the state could have devoted to other regulatory 
matters).
339
 
Standing based on a governance interest does not therefore turn on 
whether a state enacts a conflicting law or regulation. It depends on the 
nature of the federal statute. Because not every federal statute will seek 
state participation in its implementation, this approach does not turn 
states into “roving constitutional watchdog[s].”340 Moreover, because 
states do not have unlimited resources, they are not likely to sue unless 
the administrative scheme will have a substantial impact on state 
regulatory institutions. In short, the approach does not open the 
floodgates.
341
 
That does not mean, of course, that suits like Virginia’s will proceed 
to the merits. As discussed above, Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
the Declaratory Judgment Act cast some doubt on whether a federal 
court would have federal subject-matter jurisdiction over a state suit to 
invalidate a federal law that applies only to individuals.
342
 Moreover, 
even if statutory jurisdiction exists now, Congress could choose to limit 
                                                     
338. Id. at 9. 
339. See Gluck, supra note 7, at 590 (noting that ACA “requires elaborate infrastructures to be 
created and implemented at the state and local levels”). 
340. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011). 
341. Scholars have raised concerns that state standing to challenge federal power risks turning 
courts into “councils of revision” pronouncing on abstract questions of state versus federal 
authority. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 101, at 872. But under a governance approach to state 
standing, a true controversy would exist; mere preemption of state law by federal law would be 
insufficient. 
342. See supra Section III.B.1; Walsh, supra note 287, at 65 (arguing that federal courts did not 
have federal subject-matter jurisdiction over Virginia’s declaratory judgment suit because neither 
party could have brought a nondeclaratory action). 
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it. It could, for example, divest the lower federal courts of jurisdiction 
over state suits challenging a given statute—although its ability to do so 
will be limited by states’ participation in the federal political process and 
could raise constitutional concerns.
343
 A less controversial path would be 
to limit the time period in which a state may challenge a new regulatory 
regime, such as the ACA. The critical point is that the political process 
should determine the states’ access to the federal courts, rather than an 
overly narrow view of Article III standing. 
344
 
2.  Texas v. United States 
In 2014, twenty-six states, including Texas, asked a federal court to 
enjoin a federal immigration policy known as “Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents,” or “DAPA.”345 
The Secretary of Homeland Security established the policy by an 
executive memorandum that contained guidelines for federal agencies to 
consider when exercising their prosecutorial discretion to grant deferred 
action for certain individuals.
346
 Deferred action does not grant a legal 
status, but it does allow an individual to be “lawfully present in the 
United States” for a period of time, which is subject to agency 
discretion.
347
 The states challenged the Secretary’s memorandum as a 
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Take Care 
Clause of the Constitution.
348
 
The district court held that Texas had standing to seek a preliminary 
injunction based on the economic costs of issuing driver’s licenses to 
individuals “lawfully present” as a result of DAPA deferred action.349 In 
deciding whether to stay the district court’s preliminary injunction 
                                                     
343. Suits between a state and the federal government are within the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction. Congress has specified that the Court has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction over 
such suits. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). Although Congress may decide whether the United States 
consents to be sued, Congress may violate the Constitution by eliminating all federal court 
jurisdiction (including the Court’s original jurisdiction) if the federal government has consented 
(e.g., under the APA) and a federal right of action exists. See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59 
(1979) (questioning whether Congress could eliminate the Court’s original jurisdiction over 
controversies between states and the federal government). 
344. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (“State sovereign 
interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the 
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”). 
345. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015). 
346. Id. at 744. 
347. Id.  
348. Id. at 743. 
349. Id. at 746. 
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pending appeal, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit agreed with the 
court’s standing analysis.350 The two-judge majority reasoned that even 
though Texas “could avoid financial injury by raising its application fees 
to cover the full cost of issuing and administering a license,” it had 
established an Article III injury because “Texas’s forced choice between 
incurring costs and changing its fee structure is itself an injury.”351 The 
majority clearly characterized this injury as an injury to Texas’s 
“sovereign interest” in creating and enforcing laws.352 
Subsequently, in considering the government’s appeal of the 
preliminary injunction, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit again agreed 
that Texas had standing.
353
 The majority began its analysis by 
emphasizing that the state plaintiffs were entitled to “special solicitude” 
in the standing inquiry under Massachusetts v. EPA.
354
 This special 
treatment was justified because the federal policy subjected the states to 
“substantial pressure” to change their laws and the states’ surrender of 
control over immigration matters to the federal government implicated 
sovereignty interests.
355
 The appellate panel affirmed the district court’s 
grant of a preliminary injunction,
356
 and the Supreme Court agreed to 
review the case this term.
357
 Standing is one of the issues before the 
Court.
358
 
With this case, the Court has an opportunity to clarify precisely when 
and why state plaintiffs are entitled to “special solicitude” for purposes 
of Article III standing. In doing so, the Court should also make clear the 
shortcomings of the traditional injury-in-fact analysis in state challenges 
to federal law. Just as Virginia v. Sebelius illustrates how a traditional 
injury-in-fact analysis can incorrectly bar state standing, Texas v. United 
States illustrates how a traditional injury-in-fact analysis can incorrectly 
grant state standing to challenge federal policy. As the federal 
government has argued, the plaintiffs’ standing analysis arguably 
                                                     
350. Id. The panel ultimately denied the federal government’s motion to stay the district court’s 
preliminary injunction of DAPA. Id. at 769. 
351. Id. at 749. 
352. Id. 
353. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 162 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 
(2016). 
354. Id. at 151. 
355. Id. at 154–55.  
356. Id. at 188. 
357. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). 
358. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (No. 15-674), 2015 WL 7308179. 
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supports state standing to challenge virtually any federal law or action.
359
 
All a state would need to show is that it must either incur costs (however 
small) or change its laws as a result of a federal policy. And the costs 
need not be directly connected to the federal action challenged. But if 
this were truly enough for state standing, states would have standing to 
challenge virtually any federal law or policy based on indirect impacts to 
the states’ economies. There would be no meaningful limit. 
Application of the governance approach to state standing solves this 
problem. The DAPA memorandum at issue in Texas was an exercise of 
federal executive authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), a federal statute that does not contemplate an implementation 
role for state governments.
360
 In fact, immigration statutes even limit 
states’ enforcement authority.361 Because federal immigration law does 
not contemplate shared governance through state implementation, states 
do not have a governance interest that supports Article III standing. A 
state could not therefore establish standing based on a sovereignty 
interest.
362
 
A governance-interest analysis simplifies the threshold question of 
standing in a case like Texas v. United States and makes it less 
susceptible to judicial manipulation. As one of the dissenting circuit 
judges emphasized, governmental officials and state governments are 
deeply divided over DAPA; fifteen states supported the federal 
government’s position in the case.363 Judges have also used standing 
doctrine to reach conflicting results regarding similar immigration 
policies. A month before the first appellate decision in Texas, a different 
panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the indirect economic impacts of a 
similar deferred-action program were insufficient to support state 
standing.
364
 Understanding state sovereignty in terms of governance 
                                                     
359. See Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 9, Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 
2015) (No. 15-40238) (arguing that the majority’s approach would allow state standing anytime a 
state changes its law to conform to federal law—for example, by adopting an IRS definition or a 
health and safety standard). 
360. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107 (2012). 
361. 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (limiting detention authority to “certain illegal aliens”). 
362. Congress could attempt to give states standing by authorizing state challenges to federal 
actions under the INA, but it is not clear that Congress could confer Article III standing on a state 
simply by providing a statutory right of action. The Supreme Court’s recent analysis in Spokeo, Inc. 
v. Robins suggests that a statutory right of action would be insufficient without a “concrete and 
particularized” injury. 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). The Court emphasized, however, that an injury 
need not be tangible to be concrete. Id. at 1549. Injury to a state’s governance interest could 
therefore satisfy the concreteness requirement. 
363. Texas, 787 F.3d at 784 (Higginson, J., dissenting). 
364. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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interests easily resolves the standing inquiry and helps ensure that 
political debates play out in the political branches of government. 
CONCLUSION 
We live in a world of shared governance, a world in which the 
supremacy of federal law depends on state cooperation in its 
implementation, and the efficacy of state regulation depends on federal 
support and action. The federal administrative state has expanded in an 
attempt to solve complex economic and social problems that traverse 
state and even national boundaries. But particularly in the health, safety, 
and environmental arenas, federal standards would mean very little in 
the absence of state cooperation. Without the assistance of state 
administrative agencies and mechanisms, the federal government would 
be unable to implement these protections in every state or would 
implement them in a way that fails to account for important local 
differences. In this “post-sovereignty” world, we need a doctrine of state 
standing that recognizes the interests of states as co-regulators under 
some federal laws. 
The governance approach to state standing recognizes this regulatory 
reality. It allows states to challenge federal laws and actions when the 
underlying federal law contemplates state assistance in its 
implementation. When states share in the day-to-day business of 
regulating by implementing federal policy, they have a concrete 
governance interest in litigating the boundaries of state-federal authority 
and in challenging federal actions that affect states as regulatory 
partners. Massachusetts had such an interest in challenging the EPA’s 
decision not to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. And 
because the Affordable Care Act contemplates state implementation of 
market reforms and exchanges, Virginia had a governance interest in 
challenging the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of federal power. 
When federal law preempts state law, state standing should not turn on 
whether the state can allege a traditional injury-in-fact. Indeed, as Texas 
v. United States demonstrates, a state can almost always show that 
federal law has some effect on state laws or expenditures. But indirect 
injuries should not be enough. The governance approach to state 
standing would ensure that states have a direct interest in resolving 
questions of intergovernmental authority. It would also help clarify state 
standing doctrine, making it less susceptible to judicial manipulation and 
facilitating the resolution of other threshold questions. 
 
